The Chief Justice.-This is an appeal against the judgment and order of Subba Rao, J., quashing an order of the Government dated 5th July, 1951, passed under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The first respondent before us was granted two stage carriage permits for the route from Vanangupet to Madras. The time fixed for starting the two buses, the one from Madras and the other from Vanangupet was 7 a.m. The appellant before us was granted a permit for the route between Vanangupet and Mathuranthakam. The time fixed for starting of his bus was 8.5 a.m. The Regional Transport Authority on an application by the appellant changed the timings for his bus to 6-40 a.m. instead of 8-5 a.m. by his order dated 21st July, 1950. Against this order the first respondent herein preferred an appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board which restored the original timings. Thereupon the appellant preferred a revision to the Government under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. There was an application to this Court for a writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Government and this Court allowed that application and quashed the order on the ground that the order on the face of it did not disclose why the Government passed the order under section 64-A. The appellant again moved the Government subsequent to the order of this Court and the Government once again set aside the Central Road Traffic Board’s order and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The first respondent again filed another application which came on before Subba Rao, J. The learned Judge first heard and overruled a preliminary objection raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the application for a Writ of Certiorari based on the ground that the order of the Regional Transport Authority in fixing the timings was an administrative act and therefore the order of Central Road Traffic Board made on appeal and the order of the Government passed under section 64-A in revision were also Administrative Orders not liable to be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari. The learned Judge then held that viewed as a judicial order, the order of the Government must be set aside, because the Government had not assiged any reasons for their conclusion. His conclusion is stated thus:-

"In the present case the latest order of the Government is only a mechanical repetition of the words in section 64-A of the Act. It is not a judicial determination of the conditions laid down in section 64-A which entitle them to interfere with the order of the subordinate authorities. I have therefore no alternative but to quash the order of the Government."

In our opinion the appeal must be allowed, but on a ground which apparently did not loom large before the learned Judge, though it cannot be said that the point was not taken at all. It was contended by Mr. Bashyam Ayyangar for the appellant that an appeal from the order of the Regional Transport Authority changing the timings of his bus did not lie to the Central Road Traffic Board and therefore the Government by restoring the order of the Regional Transport Authority was in effect doing a proper thing, because the order of the Regional Transport Authority had become final. The only provision in the Motor Vehicles Act which confers a right of appeal in certain specified cases is section 64. The question is whether the first respondent herein could be deemed to fall under any of the clauses’(a) to (g) of that section. The learned Judge (Subba Rao, J.) was apparently inclined to take the view that he would fall within clause (6), namely, any person "aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof." Before us Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar for the first respondent suggested as an alternative clause(f) which runs thus:

"Any person being a local authority or police author

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