The Chief Justice.- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records and quash the order of His Excellency the Governor of Madras made in G.O.Ms. No. 1005, Public (Elections), dated 31st March, 1952. The said order runs as follows:-

“In pursuance of clauses 3(e) and (5) of Article 171 of the Constitution of India, I, Sri Prakasa, Governor of Madras, hereby nominate the following persons to be members of the Madras Legislative Council:-

(1) Sri Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari,

(2) Janab Mahammad Usman,

(3) Sri Vellapuram Bashyam Ayyangar,

(4) Sri Omandur P. Ramaswami Reddiar.”

The petitioner is a citizen of India and one of ,the members of the Madras Legislative Assembly elected on the communists party ticket in the recent General Elections held in January 1952. In this application he attacks in particular the nomination of the second respondent, namely, Sri C. Rajagopalachari, on several grounds. In view of our decision that the application is not sustainable at the instance of the petitioner in this case, it is not necessary to set out except in the barest outline the several grounds on which the validity of the nomination is impugned.

It was first alleged that the nomination is virtually an exercise of fraud on the powers conferred by the Constitution on the Governor, because the nomination was made with the ulterior object of assisting the Congress Legislature party. The next ground on which the validity of the nomination is challenged is that the Governor cannot exercise the power of making the nominations under Article 171(3)(e) and (5) of the Constitution except on the advice of the Council of Ministers and having regard to the fact that the nominations are to the Legislative Council which has not yet begun to function, the Council of Ministers who can advice the Government in this matter will be the Council of Ministers appointed from and out of the new legislative bodies. We refrain from making any remarks on the soundness of any of these several contentions.

We must first dispose of the argument that it is not necessary for the petitioner to have any personal and direct interest in the matter in respect of which he makes the application and that it is the duty of this Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution whenever any violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution is brought to the notice of the Court pro bono publico by any citizen of the State. The petitioner who argued his case himself went to the extent of saying that even if the attention of this Court was not drawn by any person, it was still incumbent on this Court so far as it was practicable, to interfere in this matter suo motu. Indeed, it was said that this duty followed from the form of oath taken by the Judges of this Court which comprises inter alia the promise to uphold the Constitution and the Laws. We have no hesitation in not accepting this argument. It is certainly not the province of this Court to interfere either suo motu or at the instance of any person whenever there is any disregard or violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. Our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can only be invoked at the instance of a person who has a personal grievance against any act of the State in its executive capacity which inflicts a legal injury on him. It has been held over and over again both in the United States of America and in this country that the right which is the foundation of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a corresponding provision is a personal and individual right. Chief Justice Vinson of the United States in a recent case, Sweatt v. Painter1observed:

“It is fundamental that these cases concern Rights which are personal and present.”

The Supreme Court of this country has also adopted the same principle. (Chiranjit Law Chowdhury v. The Union of India2.

It therefore falls to be considered whether the petitioner is in any mann

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