Re-opening of whole case while granting review.

This second appeal raises a question in regard to the scope of an enquiry under Order 47, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. On 8th April, 1929, the first defendant executed a mortgage deed for himself and as guardian of his undivided minor brothers, defendants 2 and 3 in favour of the plaintiffs’ father. The plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 128 of 1945 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Valangiman, for recovery of the amount due under the said mortgage. The defendants raised various pleas. They also claimed that the debt was liable to be scaled down under the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists’ Relief Act. The District Munsif gave a decree, but scaled down the mortgage amount under the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists’ Relief Act. The defendants preferred an appeal, and the District Judge by judgment, dated 30th June, 1947, held that a sum of Rs. 150 paid on 30th December, 1930, was an unappropriated payment. In regard to the payment of Rs. 300 on 30th May, 1938, he held that it was properly appropriated towards the principal and interest due on the date of payment. He negatived the plea of damdupat. In the result with a slight modification he confirmed the decree of the District Munsif. On 27th September, 1947, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, for reviewing the judgment and decree of the District Judge on the ground that there was an error on the face of the record. The error according to the petitioners was that the District Judge by mistake stated that Rs. 350 was the principal, whereas the parties agreed that the principal amount was Rs. 453-6-0. On 3rd December, 1947, the District Judge passed the following order:

“As there is an error apparent on the face of record, the review application is allowed. But since the actual working out involves arguments, the appeal itself will be reopened and reheard under Order 47, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code.”

Arguments were heard subsequently, and judgment was delivered on 20th January, 1948. The learned Judge again refused to apply the principle of damdupat. He substituted the figure of Rs. 453-6-0 in the place of Rs. 350 representing the principal amount due on 1st October, 1937. In addition, he held that a sum of Rs. 300 paid on 30th May, 1938, had to be appropriated only towards interest payable after 1st October, 1937 and the balance, in reduction of the principal. He gave a decree for a sum of Rs. 453-6-0 at 6¼ per cent. per annum only from 1st October, 1937 to 30th May, 1938, when he received payment of Rs. 300 and thereafter subsequent interest on Rs. 172-3-0 from 30th May, 1938, till the date of the plaint. The result is that though the review application was filed for correcting an obvious error on the face of the record in regard to the principal amount, the learned Judge reviewed his judgment in respect of the appropriation of a sum of Rs. 300 paid on 30th May, 1938. The plaintiffs preferred the above appeal against the decree of the learned District Judge.

Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that a court cannot review its own judgment so as to go beyond the scope of the application for review. Alternatively he argued that even if the District Judge had such jurisdiction, in the present case he should have, in his discretion, confined the scope of the rehearing and also the relief to that prayed in the review petition filed by the appellants. The relevant provision governing the situation is Order 47, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. It reads:

“When an application for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the Court may at once rehear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit.”

Before I express my view on the question raised, it will be convenient to consider the cases cited by the learned counsel. The various stages in a review application have been stated by Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Pakkiri Muhammad Rowther v. Swaminath