Satyanarayana Rao, J.-The plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed on a preliminary point by the lower Court is the appellant in this appeal. The suit was instituted under Order 1, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, with the leave of the Court on behalf of the Gowd Saraswat Brahmin community in South Kanara; and two reliefs were claimed in the plaint with reference to the suit temple which is at present being managed by an executive officer appointed by the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board in 1939 as the temple was notified under the Act (vide Ex. B-i). The reliefs which the plaintiff claimed in the plaint were two: (1) a declaration that the first defendant temple belongs to and it is the exclusive right of the members of the Gowd Saraswat Brahmin community of South Kanara who alone have the exclusive right of management and performing the puja therein; (2) a permanent injunction restraining the second defendant from introducing any form of agama ritual or mode of worship in the said temple other than the existing form, contrary to the well-established custom and usage. The suit was instituted on the 16th of April, 1947, and the objection taken was that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (II of 1927). The contention was upheld by the lower Court. Hence this appeal.

Since the decision in the case, the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (II of 1927) was repealed by the Madras Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (XIX of 1951), but the rules and the notifications issued under the repealed Act have been continued by section 103 of the new Act.

The suit being of a civil nature it remains to consider whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is taken away either expressly or impliedly by way of the provisions of Act II of 1927 Our observations regarding the provisions of Act II of 1927 which have been relied on as barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would equally apply to the corresponding provisions of the new Act. It is, therefore, unnecessary to refer in the course of the judgment to the provisions of the new Act.

The main provisions that have been relied on as barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court are sections 84(1), 73(4) and 79 and 79(a). Section 84(1) provides:

“If any dispute arises as to-

(a) Whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in this Act,

(b) Whether a trustee is a hereditary trustee as defined in this Act, or not, or

(c) Whether any property or money endowed is a specific endowment as defined in this Act or not,

such dispute shall be decided by the Board and no Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any such dispute.”

It is not claimed on behalf of the respondent that clauses (b) and (c) would apply in the present case. But he relies upon clause (a) and the contention is that the dispute raised in the plaint in respect of which the declaration is sought is a dispute which raises the question whether the institution is a temple as defined in the Act, or not; and therefore the relief sought for in the plaint is within section 84(1)(a) of the Act and the cognizance of the suit by the Civil Court is barred. He refers in this connection to the definition of “temple” in section 9, clause (12), of the Act. It states:

"‘Temple’ means a place by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship."

The argument is, if a question arises whether a temple is owned by the Hindu community as a whole or whether it is owned only by a section of that community, the dispute would then be one which can aptly be described as raising the question whether the institution is a temple or not within the meaning of section 84(1) of the Act. In our opinion, if the section is so construed, it would be placing a strained construction upon it and we think that the

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