Father of infant workman to be held as dependent.

This appeal arises out of an application filed by the respondent herein for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The respondent’s son who was of tender years was employed as a workman in the appellant’s workshop as a cleaner on a daily wage of Re. 0-4-0. The workman met with an accident on 8th May, 1949, while working in the factory during night time which resulted in his death. The respondent claimed a lump sum payment of Rs. 500 under section 3 of the Act.

This application was opposed by the employer on the ground that respondent’s son was not a workman within the meaning of the Act as he was only an apprentice, that the accident did not arise during the course of his employment and lastly that the application was incompetent as the applicant was not a dependant within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) of the Act. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation overruled these objections and granted a sum of Rs. 500 by way of compensation to the applicant. He found that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of section 2(1)(n) and that the accident occurred in the course of his employment under the appellant. As regards the competency of the applicant to maintain the application the opinion of the Commissioner was that the applicant was partly dependant on the deceased and as such was entitled to claim compensation.

The employer has filed this appeal against that order.

In this appeal, the findings of the Commissioner on the first two issues were not seriously challenged as they were essentially questions of fact. Under section 30 of the Act this Court’s jurisdiction to interfere with an order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation in appeal is confined to substantial questions of law. That being so it is not open to the appellant to question the correctness of the conclusion of the Commissioner on those two questions.

The only point that was debated was that the respondent was not a dependant within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Under that section a dependant

“includes a parent other than a widowed mother if wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death.”

In order to come within the ambit of the definition of a “dependant” a father has to prove that he was dependant upon the earnings of his deceased son either wholly or in part.

The appellant contends that in this case the parent is not a dependant because on his own admission he was not in any way depending on the earnings of his son. The statement of the applicant in the evidence that has given rise to this conclusion is this:

“At the time of his death he was eking Re. 0-4-0 per day. The expenses for the food of the deceased would be about Rs. 20 to Rs. 25 per month. He was paid Rs. 6 per month. For other expenses, I used to pay him for dress, etc.”

The counsel for the appellant urges that on this admission the father cannot be said to be a dependant within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) of the Act In order to claim the benefit under section 2, the parent must show, the learned counsel argues, that out of the earnings of the son there was a balance which was useful to him. In support of this contention he cited a decision of a Bench of this Court in Venkataramayya v. Babasahib1. There their Lordships had to consider whether a father without even alleging that he was dependant on the earnings of the deceased workman could maintain an application for compensation. The learned Judges expressed the opinion that under section 2(1)(d) as amended by Act XI of 1933 a parent had no locus standi to claim compensation under the Act without proof of his dependence on the earnings of the workman either wholly or in part. It may be pointed out that prior to 1933 sub-clause (d) stood as follows:

“‘Dependant’ means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely, a wife, husband, parent, minor son, unmarried daughter, married daughter who is a minor, etc.”

But the amendment took away the parent other