This is a revision petition sought to be filed against the affirming judgment of the learned Sessions Judge of Krishna in C.A. No. 17 of 1952 confirming the conviction and sentence of the Additional First Class Magistrate of Vijayawada in C.C. No. 432 of 1950.

The facts of the case have been fully set out in the judgments of the lower Courts and the record shows that there was valid, acceptable, and adequate evidence for the conviction that followed and the sentence is also found to be appropriate. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere in regard to the merits as well as the extent of the sentence.

The substantial point of law taken before me is the contention based upon the decision of the Punjab High Court in The Slate v. Gurucharan Singh1, wherein it was held that section 5(1)(c) of Act II of 1947 repealed pro tanto section 409, Indian Penal Code. But with greatest respect for the decision, I find no reasons whatsoever for holding that section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act repeals section 409, Indian Penal Code.

A “special law” is a law applicable to a particular subject: see section 41, Indian Penal Code. Under section 5, Indian Penal Code, no special law is repealed, varied, suspended or affected by the enactment of the Indian Penal Cods. Although an offence is expressly made punishable by a special or local law, it will be also punishable under the Penal Code, if the facts, come within the definition of the Code: Reg v. Ramachandrappa2. The general principle of law is that the Penal Code would apply if the acts fall within the Indian Penal Code though there may be specific offences and penalties under the special act. Accordingly, the High Court of Madras held that a prisoner might be punished under section 465, Indian Penal Code, for making a false declaration under section 5 of Act X of 1841 (Ship Register), though a specified penalty is provided by section 23 of that Act. (See Rulings of 1865 on section 5). There have been similar decisions in regard to other special Acts. It is enough to cite a few cases. In regard to offence under Indian Penal Code and Provincial Insolvency Act, see Queen v. Ramachandrappa1; for offences under Local Boards Act and Indian Penal Code, see Molaiappa Goundan, In re2; for conviction under Indian Penal Code though offence falls within purview of Motor Vehicles Act also, see Jiwa Ram v. Emperor3; for offences under Salt Act and Indian Penal Code see Emperor v. Joti Prasad4; for Indian Railways Act and Indian Penal Code, see Kuloda Prasad Majumdar v. The Emperor,5 which distinguished Chandi Pershad v. Abdur Rahman6, wherein it was held that a special penal provision as in the Railways Act would not always exclude the operation of the Penal Code. The most familiar example however is of the identical provisions contained in the Indian Penal Code regarding rash and negligent driving and under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus where the accused while driving a motor car on the wrong side of the road and at a blind corner between two roads of considerable traffic came into collision with a motor bicycle and caused damage to the side car of the bicycle it was held that the accused was guilty of an offence under section 279, Indian Penal Code and the sentence of three months’ rigorous inprisonment passed on the accused by the lower Court was upheld. It was argued on behalf of the accused in this case that the more appropriate section would be Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act but the Judges remarked that the offence committed by the accused was serious and that the mere fact that the Motor Vehicles Act also contained a provision for dealing with offences of this nature would not exclude the operation of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, it is idle to contend that a special law repeals the provisions of the Indian Penal Code because both of them deal with offences arising under both the Acts.

There are however two important restrictions. No prosecution under the special law is