Starting point of limitation u/s 106 of three months.

In this case the Inspector of Factories inspected the factory in question on 5th October, 1950 and found that the accused had failed to construct a pucca dust proof husk chamber as required by section 14 of the Factories Act. The failure to do this is an offence punishable under section 92 of the Act. Under section 106 of the Act no Court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector. A complaint for this offence must be laid within three months from the above date, i.e., 5th October, 1950. But the complaint was laid on 15th March, 1951 and it is dearly beyond three months. But it is argued that the Inspector visited the factory again on 24th January, 1951, when also he found the above defect and the complaint being within three months from the later date, the complaint is within time. In support of this contention a decision of Subba Rao, J., in Crl.R.C. No. 417 of 1950, is cited. In my view, the period of three months is to be calculated from the time the Inspector had first knowledge of the offence. Otherwise, it would only mean an extension of period. The knowledge in the section means the knowledge which the Inspector had first obtained and not subsequently. In view of the different opinion which Subba Rao, J., has held it is necessary that this should be decided by a Bench. I therefore direct this to be posted before a Bench.

The case came on for hearing before the Bench in pursuance of the above Order.

The Public, Prosecutor (V.T. Rangaswami Aiyangar) in person.

M.V. Ganapathi for Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Govinda Menon, J.- This appeal has been referred to a Bench by Somasundaram, J., on account of a difference of view between himself and Subba Rao, J., with regard to the proper construction to be put upon section 106 of the Factories Act (LXIII of 1948). The facts are stated in the judgment of our learned brother, Somasundaram, J., and need not be re-stated here. What happened was that the respondents here failed to comply with the provisions of section 14 of the Factories Act by not putting up a dust proof husk chamber in the factory, and this was noticed by the Inspector of Factories when he visited the place on 5th October, 1950. As a result of that, the Inspector issued a notice on the manager and the occupier to rectify this defect within a period of time mentioned by him. Nothing was done with the result that when the Inspector again visited the factory on 24th January, 1951, it was found that the status quo ante continued, whereupon a chargesheet under section 92 of the Factories Act for having committed an offence under section 14 of the Factories Act was laid before the Magistrate on 15th March, 1951. Among other points the learned Magistrate found that the prosecution was barred by the provisions of section 106 of the Factories Act, because the alleged offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector on 5th October, 1950, when he first visited the factory, and the prosecution having been launched more than three months thereafter, was barred by the provisions of that section. Subba Rao, J., in Criminal Revision Case No. 417 of 1950 took the view that such offences were continuing ones, and according to the learned Judge if the argument of limitation were to prevail, it would lead to an anomalous situation that once the authorities concerned overlooked a contravention of a certain specific provision by the manager or the owner of the factory, they would be precluded for ever from complaining against subsequent delinquencies on his part. Such being the case, the learned Judge was of opinion that being a continuing wrong, every succeeding act gave rise to a cause of action.

It cannot be disputed that the offence committed is a continuing one, for the non-erection of a dust proof husk chamber, for every day of such fa