Govinda Menon, J.-This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of our learned brother Subba Rao, J., in W.P.No.176 of 1951 by which he refused to set aside the order of the State of Madras dated 1st June, 1951, which in its turn set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority East Godavari, and granted a stage coach permit to the 2nd respondent for the route Rajahmundry to Tuni via Pithapuram.

On 22nd June, 1949, the Regional Transport Authority, East Godavari by notification under section 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, notified a new route Rajahmundry to Tuni via Pithapuram, and invited applications for the grant of one pucca stage carriage permit for operating on the said route. The appellant and the 2nd respondent herein, along with a number of other people applied for the permit. The Regional Transport Authority granted the permit to the appellant, which order was confirmed on appeal, by the Central Road Traffic Board. Under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, an application to revise the order of the Regional Transport Authority was made to the Government who set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and issued a permit to the second respondent. Thereupon the appellant applied to this Court tor issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the State of Madras Our learned brother, Subba Rao, J., held that there were no grounds for interfering with the order of the State Government and dismissed the application. Hence this appeal. against that order.

A preliminary objection is taken by Mr. D. Narasaraju for the 2nd respondent that no appeal lies against an order of a single Judge either issuing, or refusing to issue, a writ of certiorari, and that clause 15 of the Letters Patent has no application. This is controverted by the learned counsel for the appellant. While contending that the order appealed against should not be interfered with, the learned Advocate-General controverts the position taken by the 2nd respondent that in matters like this no appeal lies. We have therefore to decide whether the contention put forward on behalf of the 2nd respondent can be acceded to or not. The old Supreme Court of Madras, which was the predecessor of this High Court, inherited the jurisdictional powers of the King’s Bench of England under the Charter of 1800, and as such it could issue such prerogative writs within the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court. The view once held as laid down in In re Kochunni Elaya Nair1 and In re Govindan Nair2, that this Court can issue such writs throughout the entire ambit of its appellate jurisdiction has been held to be unsustainable by the Judicial Committee in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi3, where Viscount Simon, L.C., in delivering the judgment of the Board held that the High Court at Madras had no power to issue a writ of certiorari beyond the limits of the Presidency Town of Madras except in a limited manner as regards British subjects. But this position has been altered by the enactment of Article 226 of the Constitution which gives power to the High Court, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,. mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them. It need therefore hardly be said that this Court has got the power to issue such writs. Under Article 225 the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court and the respective powers of the Judges therefore in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts,, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. Under this pr

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