Govinda Menon, J.-This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution of India and sections 109 and 110 read with the rules under Order 45, Civil Procedure Code, against the order of this Court in C.M.A.No.332 of 1945.

E.P.No.90 of 1944 in O.S.No.14 of 1926 was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai on the ground that it was barred by limitation and in appeal against that order this Court found that the execution petition was in time and remanded the same to the Subordinate Judge to take steps in furtherance of execution. The only question that was decided by this Court is one of limitation and in that controversy the view taken was different from that of the Subordinate Judge.

A preliminary objection was taken that the Order of this Court is not a “final order” within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution of India and therefore even if we are convinced that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, no leave can be granted. It is undisputed that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was, and is not less than, Rs.20,000. Unless therefore we are convinced that the order of remand passed by this Court is a “final order”, the provisions of Article 133 cannot be invoked. In clause (1) of Article 133 it is clearly stated that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court if it satisfies any of the three conditions contemplated in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) which follow. The point for decision therefore is whether the decision of this Court remanding the execution petition for a further hearing and disposal by the Subordinate Judge is a final order.

Mr. Bhashyam for the petitioners relies upon a decision in Sathappa Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti1. In that case Oldfield and Ramesam, JJ., considered certain English and Indian decisions and held that where in a suit for dissolution of partnership and connected reliefs, including the taking of an account, the Court of first instance held that the suit was barred by limitation, but the High Court, in appeal, reversed the finding on limitation and declared the plaintiff’s right to relief and remanded the case to the lower Court to frame a preliminary decree and take further proceedings according to law, the order of the High Court is a final order within the meaning of section 109, Civil Procedure Code, as it then stood. This decision considered the meaning of the words “final” and “interlocutory” and referred to Wharton’s Law Lexicon regarding the meaning of the term “interlocutory”. In the well-known case in Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand2, Viscount Cave in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee referred to Salaman v. Warner3 and Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council4 and held that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The genesis of this definition can be traced to the expression of opinion by Lord Esher, M.R. and Fry, L.J., in Salaman v. Warner3. At page 735 Lord Esher, M.R., says that if their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, then for the purposes of the rules, it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then, it is not final but interlocutory. Fry, L.J., also took a similar view. The learned Lord Justice spoke as follows:

“I conceive that an order is ‘final’ only where, it is made upon an application or other proceeding which must, whether such application or other proceeding fail or succeed, determine the action. Conversely, I think that an order is ‘interlocutory’ where it cannot be affirmed that in either event the action will be determined.”

In Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District C

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