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1951 Supreme(Mad) 154

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. Justice Raghava Rao, J.
The Official Assignee, Madras representing the estates and effects of Messrs. Uma & Co.
Versus
M.C. Ranganathan
S.A.No.1927 of 1950.
Decided On : 19 April 1951

Advocates:
B.V. Viswanatha Aiyar for Petitioner.
The Government Pleader (P. Satyanarayana Raju) for Respondent.

Judgment.-

An interesting point of law has been argued at some length with his usual ability and emphasis by Mr. B.V. Viswanatha Ayyar in this case. The question is one of court-fee payable on a plaint transferred from the Original Side of the High Court to the Madras City Civil Court under section 16, proviso (2) of the Madras City Civil Court Act. The petitioner was called upon after the transfer to pay the additional court-fee which would have been payable on the plaint, had it been filed even at the inception in the City Civil Court. It is objected for the petitioner that the course adopted by the Court below is not valid.

The pith and substance of the argument of Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar is that there is no charging section in the City Civil Court Act or in the Court-Fees Act which warrants the levy of the additional court-fee. My attention has been drawn by learned counsel to the language of section 16, proviso (3) of the Act which, it is said, contains no such language as is to be found in section 14. The contention is that section 16, proviso (3), cannot be regarded as a taxing section, as section 14 can be. Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar argues that in the absence of any clear specific taxing section in the City Civil Court Act or elsewhere it is not open to the Court to seek to levy the extra court-fee, as though the suit in question had been even originally instituted in the City Civil Court itself.

Section 14 deals with cases removed to the High Court from the City Civil Court. Section 16, proviso (3) deals with a suit or other proceeding transferred from the High Court on its Original Side to the City Civil Court. In the former section there is a definite provision, it is true, to the effect that fees on the scale for the time being in force in the High Court as a Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction shall be payable in that Court in respect of the suit and proceedings removed to it for trial; and there is a proviso to the section which says further that in the levy of any such fees which according to the practice of the Court are credited to the Government, credit shall be given to the plaintiff in the suit for any fee which in the City Civil Court he has already paid under the Court-Fees Act, 1870, on the plaint. In section 16 what is said, so far as material to the present case is that,

“Nothing in this Act contained shall affect the original Civil jurisdiction of the High Court: Provided that-

(2) in any suit or other proceeding pending at any time in the High Court, any Judge of such Court may at any stage thereof make an order transferring the same to the City Civil Court if in his opinion such suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of that Court and should be tried therein;

(3) in any suit or other proceeding so transferred, the Court-Fees Act, 1870, shall apply credit being given for any fees levied in the High Court”.

It is said by learned counsel for the petitioner that the words “the Court-Fees Act, 1870, shall apply” are not themselves sufficient to imply the result contended for by the Government in regard to the extra court-fee payable after the transfer in the City Civil Court. The argument, how ever, overlooks the immediately following words “credit being given for any fees levied in the High Court”. It is perfectly clear that the object and purpose of section 16, proviso (3) are to authorise the levy of further court-fee in accordance with the requirements of the Court-Fees Act as if the suit was one instituted in the City Civil Court itself at the inception. This, in fact, is not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner but what is contended is that the object and purpose have not been effectuated by the language used. Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar has further contended that in the Court-Fees Act there is no provision once the plaint has been accepted, as stamped with the proper amount of court-fee, for the Court thereafter to levy any extra court-fee, although under section 12 of the Court-Fees Act the








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