Acquiring of occupancy right by tenant.

The Chief Justice.-This second appeal originally came on before Panchapagesa Sastry, J., who referred it to a Division Bench in view of the conflict of decisions between Demudu v. Papayya Raju1and Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetharamaswami2.

This second appeal arises out of a suit for evicting certain tenants in occupation of lands in an agraharam which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, which amended clause (d) of section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908). The only facts necessary for understanding the point which falls for decision are as follows: The first respondent’s father, an inamdar, obtained a decree for eviction in respect of the suit lands on 7th April, 1933 and obtained delivery of them on 23rd May, 1933. He let the lands to the defendants by a lease, dated 22nd June, 1933. The period of lease was one year ending 15th March, 1934. The defendants, however, continued to remain in possession thereafter. In 1937, the inamdar gave a notice to quit and eventually filed the suit for eviction on 24th April, 1944. The main defence of the tenants was that they had acquired occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 and therefore the suit for eviction was not maintainable. Both the courts decreed the suit and defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants.

The relevant provisions which have a material bearing on the question to be decided are section 6, sub-section (1) Explanations (1) and (2) and section 8, subsection (5) of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) as amended by Act XVIII of 1936, i.e., the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. Section 6(1) declares that

“Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding”.

Explanation (1) runs thus-

“For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression ‘every ryot now in possession’ shall include every person who, having held land as a ryot, continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act”.

Ordinarily the word “now” in sub-section (1) and the words “at the commencement of this Act” must be taken to refer to the date of the passing of Madras Act I of 1908. Explanation (2) became necessary, because by the provisions of Madras Act XVIII of 1936 certain inam villages, which did not fall within the definition of an estate originally contained in Madras Act I of 1908, became estates by virtue of the new provisions. It was necessary to provide for a different construction of the words “now” and “at the commencement of this Act” in relation to such inam villages. Explanation (2), therefore, declares that the expressions “now” and “commencement of this Act” in sub-section (1) and Explanation (1) shall be construed as meaning the thirtieth day of June, 1934, and the expression “hereafter” in the sub-section shall be construed as meaning the period after the thirtieth day of June, 1934. Madras Act XVIII of 1936 came into force on 31st October, 1936. But for reasons which need not detain us now, the Legislature took a date prior to the date of the coming into force of that Act as the material date to denote the tenants in occupation of the lands in such villages who would be entitled to permit rights of occupancy.

It will be noticed that sub-section (1)of section 6 commences with the words “subject to the provisions of this Act” and the provisions of section 8(5) are to take effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Act. That sub-section provides that

“If before the first day of November, 1933, the landholder has obtained in respect of any land in a village which became an estate by virtue of Act XVIII of 1936 a final decree or order of competent Civil Court”.

Declaring that the tenant has no occupancy right in such land, the landholder shall, if the land is not private land