Alienation of property under undue influence by mother and natural guardian.

This Civil Revision Petition raises a question relating to court-fee and jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed a suit for recovering possession of properties alienated by the first defendant, his mother and natural guardian. The suit is based on the allegations that the first defendant who was an illiterate woman inexperienced in life was influenced by her brother to alienate the properties for very low consideration in his favour and in favour of some of his nominees and that the alienations were not therefore binding on him. The plaintiff valued the suit under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act at Rs. 2,589-6-0 and gave the same valuation for purposes of jurisdiction also and paid court-fee thereon. The defendants contended in the lower court that the plaintiff should have asked for cancellation of the sale deeds executed by his mother as guardian and paid court-fee under section 7(iv-A). The trial court took this matter up as a preliminary question and decided that the plaint should be construed as one asking for a prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds and that therefore the plaintiff should be called upon to pay court-fee under section 7(iv-4) of the Court-Fees Act. In reaching this conclusion he relied upon some decisions of this court one reported in Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar1, a decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J., and another ruling reported in Venkatakrishniah v. Shaik Ali Sahib2 and also in Devaki Antarjanam v. Mariakutti Umma3

The present revision petition is filed against that order of the District Munsiff by the aggrieved plaintiff. The validity of this Order is attacked by the counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the view taken by the trial Court is not sound and sustainable having regard to a number of decisions of this Court which lay down the principle that in cases similar to this the plaint need not contain a prayer for cancellation or for setting aside the sale deeds.

The short question that has to be considered by me therefore is whether the plaintiff’s valuation of the suit under section 7(v) of the Court-Fees Act is correct or whether he is bound to frame the suit as one under section 7(iv-A) for the purpose of court-fees and jurisdiction. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner cited to me a number of authorities and contended that the decisions relied on by the trial Court did not lay down the correct law and were in conflict with some of the Bench decisions of our High Court.

It is no doubt true that the rulings in Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar1, Venkatakrishniah v. Shaik Ali Sahib2, and also Devaki Antarjanam v. Mariakutti Umma3, support the view taken by the trial Court. In Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar1, the mother as the guardian of her minor son executed a release deed in favour of the erstwhile partners of her husband. On attaining majority the sons brought a suit for a declaration that the release was invalid and for an injunction. It was held by Venkatasubba Rao, J., that looking to the substance of the plaint it must be treated as one for cancellation of the instrument and will so come under section 7(iv-A). This was followed by Wadsworth, J., in Venkatakrishnayya v. Shaik Ali Sahib2. In Deveki Antarjanam v. Mariakutti Umma3, Somayya, J., followed this decision of Wadsworth, J.

I shall now proceed to see whether these rulings are in conflict with the cases cited by the counsel for the petitioner. In Unni v. Kunchi Ammal4, the principle was enunciated that in a suit on behalf of a Malabar tarward by two of its members to recover property improperly alienated by the late Karnavan, a prayer for cancellation of the kanom interest was not an essential part of the plaintiff’s relief and that therefore the suit brought beyond three years of the execution of the document was not barred by limitation. Though the alienation in that case was not made by a guardian of a minor, the following passage in that judgment would show t