This is a second appeal preferred by a wife against the decree of dismissal by the Courts below of her suit against her husband for separate maintenance. The suit was filed by the wife and her two minor unmarried daughters against the first defendant for maintenance on the ground that he had brought another woman into the house and was ill-treating the plaintiffs. It was found by the Courts below-and this finding is not challenged in second appeal-that the “other woman” referred to by the plaintiffs was the second wife of the defendant and the ill-treatment alleged by the plaintiffs was not true. Though the Hindu Married Woman’s Rights to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (XIX of 1946) (hereinafter called the Act) came into force on 23rd April, 1946, and the judgment of the appellate Court dismissing the plaintiff’s suit was pronounced on 22nd October, 1946, yet no reliance was placed on the Act in support of the claim of the plaintiffs. The Act was not in force when the trial Court gave its decision or when the appeal was filed in the lower appellate Court. In second appeal, however, the claim of the plaintiffs is based only on the Act. Three points now arise for decision (1) Whether it was open to me for the first time in second appeal, to entertain the plea based on the Act; (2) whether on a true construction of section 2 (4) of the Act, the wife and/or her minor daughters are entitled to maintenance in a case where the husband had married a second wife before the Act came into force; (3) what is the proper rate of maintenance to be awarded if the above two points are answered in favour of the plaintiffs.

On the first point, I am of the opinion that the suit being one for future maintenance, it is permissible for this Court in second appeal to consider the effect of legislation which came into force after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court and during the pendency of the appeal in the appellate Court. The ordinary rule is that a Court should give its decision on the facts and circumstances as they existed at the date of the institution of the suit or at the date of any subsequent amendment of the pleadings and should not take notice of events or decisions which have happened after such date. But the Court has power in a proper case to take notice of events subsequent to the suit in order to shorten litigation, avoid unnecessary expense and do complete justice between the parties. If a cause of action not available on the date of the suit accrues during its pendency, the Court has a discretion to grant an amendment of the plaint so as to enable the plaintiff to include the fresh cause of action. The terms of Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, are very wide and do not prohibit such a course, see Doraiswami Pillai v. ChinnayyaGoundan1, Subbaraya Chetti v. Nachiar Ammal2. Where, however, the facts are not in dispute and the accrual of a cause of action subsequent to the suit is under the terms of a statute of which the courts must take notice, a formal amendment of the plaint is unnecessary, for the Court is bound to administer the law of the land at the date when it gives its decision on a dispute. Mr. K.V. Ramachandra Iyer, the learned advocate for the respondent maintains that the remedy of the plaintiffs, if any, is by way of a fresh suit and I cannot, sitting in second appeal, interfere with the decrees of the courts below which were right on the materials they had before them. I cannot accept this contention. As pointed out by Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., in Krishnamachariar v. Mangammal1, a case decided before the new Civil Procedure Code of 1908, an appeal is under the processual law of this country, in the nature of a rehearing of the cause. This view has been affirmed and accorded legislative sanction by the enactment of section 107(2) and Order, 41 rule 33, Civil Procedure Code of 1908. The Judicial Committee acted on this principle and dismissed an appeal on the strength of legislation which came