Nature of the order to be passed u/s 41(3) of the Act.

The petitioner seeks a revision of the order of the District Judge of North Arcot at Vellore directing him to deliver the properties in his possession to the respondents, who claim to be entitled thereto on the death of a minor ward, for whose properties the petitioner had been appointed as a guardian by the District Court under section 16 of the Guardians and Wards Act. The ward died before attaining majority. The respondents claiming to be entitled to the estate as next heirs applied to the District Court that the petitioner, the guardian appointed by that Court, should be directed to hand over to them the possession of the properties of which he had taken charge as guardian. Objection was taken on the part of the guardian to the grant of the relief claimed by the respondents on various grounds. The main contention was that the Court had no power under section 41, sub-section (3) of the Guardians and Wards Act to direct the certificated guardian to hand over the properties of the deceased minor to persons claiming to be entitled to them on the death of the minor. A further objection was that the respondents claimed the properties not as the heirs of the minor but as reversioners entitled to the estate on the death of the minor. A somewhat vague suggestion was also made that the minor died under some suspicious circumstances and therefore the respondents were disentitled to the relief asked for by them.

It is contended by Mr. K.V.Ramachandra Aiyar that the Court below misconstrued the provisions of section 41, sub-section (3) of the Guardians and Wards Act and assumed a jurisdiction which it did not possess under this provision of law. It is argued that section 41, sub-section 3 refers to the cessation of the powers of a guardian arising in the manner and in the circumstances enumerated in section 41, sub-sections (1) and (2) and not in any other way. Section 41, sub-section (1) clause (a) and sub-section (2) clause (a) refer to the death, removal or discharge of a guardian as resulting in the cessation of his powers as guardian. In none of the clauses of section 41, sub-section (1) or section 41, sub-section (2) is there any reference to the death of the minor though there is specific reference to the death of a guardian as an event which leads to the cessation of the guardian’s powers. It is therefore argued that section 41, sub-section (3) when it refers to the cessation of the powers of a guardian refers back to sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 41 and does not include the death of a minor within its scope and ambit. The argument is no doubt plausible and has appealed to a learned Judge of this Court. I am, however, unable to agree that section 41, sub-section (3) is limited in its operation to cases where the powers of a guardian cease for any of the reasons or in any of the modes enumerated in section 41, sub-sections (1) and (2). It has been suggested for the respondent that section 41(1), clause (c) and 41(2), clause (c) which refer to the contingency of the ward ceasing to be a minor might refer to the death of the minor. It is no doubt true that if the ward ceases to exist owing to his death he also ceases to be a minor. This contention, however, is in my opinion far-fetched.

When the Legislature expressly referred to the death of a guardian in sections 41(1) and (2) it might have also referred to the contingency of a minor’s death as an event on the happening of which the powers of a guardian cease. At the same time it does not follow that the operation of section 41 sub-section (3) should be cut down by a reference to sections 41(1) and 41(2). The words “when, for any cause, the powers of a guardian cease” in section 41(3) are wide enough to cover a case where the powers of a guardian cease by reason of the death of the minor ward. After the death of a ward the person who was appointed his guardian does not continue to be his guardian, and the language of section 41, sub-section (3) is wide enough to be so