Effect of amendment to law of limitation.

The Chief Justice.-The facts necessary for appreciating the question of law which arises in this appeal may be briefly stated. The appellant filed a suit to recover amounts due for principal and interest under three promissory notes dated 21st August, 1929, 28th August, 1929 and 4th September, 1929. The suit was filed on 9th August, 1944. The appellant relied upon four endorsements of payment to save the claim from the bar of limitation. The last of such endorsements was made on 9th August, 1941. It has been found by both the Courts below that these endorsements are of “open payments” which would not save the claim from the bar of limitation under section 20 of the Limitation Act as it stood before the Amending Act XVI of 1942. The appeal was argued on that assumption. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that the amending Act applied to the suit and the endorsements would be sufficient within the meaning of section 20 as amended by it. Both the Courts held that the appellant could not rely upon the amending Act, because the claim to recover the amounts due under the suit promissory notes became barred by limitation prior to the coming into force of the amending Act and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation.

The case is directly covered by the decision of Viswanatha Sastri, J, in Manga-pathi Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu1. An unreported decision of Somasundaram, J., in Hanumayamma v. Venkatanarasimharao2, is to the same effect. Satyanarayana Rao, J., before whom the appeal came on originally for hearing however thought that as the question raised was of sufficient importance and of frequent occurrence there should be an authoritative decision by a Division Bench.

We agree with Mr. N. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar, the learned Advocate for the appellant, that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding is the law in force at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding unless there is a distinct provision to the contrary. It is also well settled that the law of limitation being procedural law, its provisions operate retrospectively in the sense that they apply to causes of action which arose before their enactment. But on an examination of the authorities on the point we find it equally well established that if a right to sue had become barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act then in force on the date of the coming into force of a later enactment, then such a barred right is not revived by the application of the new enactment.

Section 2 of the Limitation Act of 1877 expressly provided as follows:

"A reference to the Indian Limitation Act, 1871, shall be read as if made to this Act, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any title acquired, or to revive any right to sue barred, under that Act or under any enactment thereby repealed."

No doubt a similar provision is not found in the Limitation Act of 1908, but this is probably because of section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act of 1897 which embodies a similar provision. Apart from decided cases it appears to follow on principle that the right of action barred by limitation at the time when a new Act or amendment comes into force cannot be revived by the subsequent change in the law brought about by the new Act or amendment.

The preponderance of decided cases also leads us to the same conclusion. There is a long catena of Privy Council rulings in which we find the same principle enunciated. One of the earliest of such cases is Appaswami Odayar v. Subramania Odayar3. The point is dealt with thus:

”By section 1, clause 13, of Act XIV of 1859, a suit for a share of the family property not brought within twelve years from the date of the last participation in the profits of it would be barred. This Act continued in force until the 1st July, 1871, when Act IX of 1871 came into force. Consequently, if there was no participation of profits between 1837 and 1871, the suit would be barred, and the later Acts for limitation of suits need not