Forum for filing petition u/s 14(2) for receiving the award.

Horwill, J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgment that my learned brother is about to deliver and respectfully agree with its reasoning. It seems to me that much of the difficulty that has arisen in this and similar cases is due to the overlooking of the fact that section 2(c) of the Act merely defines the word “court”, and that if one has to decide which of the courts satisfying the definition of the word “court”, in section 2(c) is the court in which the award has to be filed, one must look to section 31(1) and that section alone. Section 2(c) does not purport to prescribe the court in which the award should be filed. It restricts the meaning of the word “court” to the class of civil courts that can decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if they had arisen in a suit properly before the court. The difficulty in the construction of this section arises only from the circumstance that the word “court” would have meanings which would vary with the subject-matter of the reference. In the present case, for example, District Munsif’s Courts would not be courts within the definition. If now we have regard to section 31(1) to ascertain in which court, as the word is defined in section 2(c), the award has to be filed, we find that it is the court that has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award, the omission of any reference to residence being presumably for the reason that in filing an award there is no plaintiff and no defendant. If the subject-matter of the reference alone determines jurisdiction, then admittedly this appeal will have to be allowed.

Balakrishna Ayyar, J.-This appeal calls for a construction of certain provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.

This is how the matter comes up. Venkatasamiappa, the appellant before us, is a resident of Bangalore city. The respondent is a limited liability company called the Srinidhi Ltd., with its office at No. 292, China Bazaar Road, Madras. Between September, 1944, and June, 1945 the respondent carried out various works in Bangalore for the Public Works Department of the Government of India. The appellant was a sub-contractor supplying at the outset labour and subsequently various materials for the work, which the respondent was executing in Bangalore, The appellant claimed that in respect of his dealings with the respondent, he was entitled to be paid a sum of about Rs. 36,000. The respondent company, however, asserted that if the accounts between the parties were looked into, it would be found that far from their owing any money to the appellant, he would be found liable to pay them large sums. The disputes between the parties were referred to arbitration by an agreement dated 31st December, 1945, which was apparently executed at Madras. That agreement has not been placed before us; but it is common ground that the arbitrators are all of them residents of Madras City. After an elaborate enquiry the arbitrators gave their award on 14th May, 1947, where-under they directed the appellant to pay the respondent the sum of Rs. 22,346. After making their award, the arbitrators filed a petition under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, on the Original Side of this court praying that the award be received, that notice of the filing of the award be sent to the parties and that a decree in terms of the award be passed. At the hearing of the petition Mr. Ranganatha Sastri on behalf of the appellant took the objection that this court has no jurisdiction to receive the award. Subba Rao, J. who heard the petition, overruled his objections and directed that a decree in terms of the award be passed. Hence this appeal.

Before us Mr. Ranganatha Sastri raised two points. The first is that the view of Subba Rao, J. that this court has jurisdiction to receive the award and pass a decree in terms thereof is erroneous. To assess the validity of his objection, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act.