Use of unregistered agreement of lease as evidene.

The suit in this case is for damages for breach of an agreement of lease. The document evidencing the agreement has been ruled out by both the Courts below for want of registration. The question is whether it has been rightly so ruled out.

A typed translation of the document has been placed before me by the learned counsel for the respondent, which has been accepted by the learned counsel for the appellant as correct. It-runs as follows:-

"Agreement, dated 30th May, 1942, executed by R. Subba Reddiar residing at Chinnakavanda-nur, Velliyanai village, Karur taluk in favour of R. Muruga Mudaliar of Mohanur village, Namakkal taluk.

Having agreed this day for a lease on a rent of Rs. 600 per year in respect of four acres known as Onnekalkani, etc., belonging to me in Vangal, I have received this day Rs. 100 as advance.

You having agreed for 3½ years (in respect of) the above lands you shall pay the rent at the end of Kalavati each year and shall get receipt therefor."

It is argued for the appellant that the Courts below are in error because the document on its true construction must be regarded as nothing more than a receipt acknowledging payment of Rs. 100 as advance by the plaintiff which even if it required registration as falling within section 17(1)(c) of the Indian Registration Act and could not be used as evidencing the agreement of lease itself referred to therein owing to the prohibition of section 49(c) might still be used for the collateral purpose of proving an anterior oral agreement which would nonetheless be valid because oral. I cannot accept this view of the document and my judgment in C.M.A. No. 255 of 1946 relied on for the appellant does not govern the present case.

The document is styled an agreement. The label given to it by the parties is of some significance as to their intention although not conclusive. It may be noted that the English word "agreement" itself is used at the head of the vernacular document. If the document is an agreement, as it purports to be, it can be nothing else than an agreement of lease. It contains the terms of the bargain between the parties and is in my opinion the bargain itself, the agreement itself as it professes to be on its face, and not merely an informal or incomplete memorandum of the terms of a bargain already concluded and later sought to be reduced to writing. It is not that the reference to the transaction of lease in the body of the document occurs as a thing of an incidental character or of only subordinate significance as it might well be if the document purported to be something else than an agreement, if the document called itself, say, a receipt and only proceeded to refer to the transaction of lease in order to indicate the situation in connection with which the payment was made which is acknowledged by the receipt. The land by its name, the rate of rent per year and the period of the lease are all mentioned. The dominant purpose of the document seems to be not to serve as a receipt in respect of the payment as such so much as to register the terms of the transaction as a whole in connection with which the payment came to be made. The word "agreement" is used not merely in the preamble but twice again in the body of the document and seems designated deliberately to emphasise such purpose. Some point was sought to be made by the learned counsel for the appellant of the fact that according to his case in the plaint there were also certain other terms agreed upon between the parties than those mentioned in the document. That is however disputed by the respondent in the written statement. Moreover on its face the document does not bear to be an informal or incomplete record of the terms of the transaction. It rather reads like the sole authentic repository of the terms of the bargain, and evidence adding to the terms of the document stands accordingly forbidden by section 92 of the Evidence Act. It was also submitted for the appellant that the learned District Ju