1949 Supreme(Mad) 430
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Mr. P.V.Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Krishnaswami Nayudu.
Vanka Lakshminarayana Sastri
Versus
Mangalapalli Sundararamayya
Appeal No. 65 of 1947.
Decided On : 06 December 1949
B. Sivaramamurthi and Ch. Suryamrayana Rao for Appellant.
V. Subrahmanyam, V.V. Sastri, C. Rama Rao, K. Kameswara Rao, U. Sethumathava Rao and N. Bapiraju for Respondents.
“In case adoption does not take place even in this manner, the properties intended for the adopted boy shall belong to my mother and elder brother.”
Shortly after Dattatrayalu’s death, there was a deed of settlement executed on 8th October, 1897, by Subbayya Sastrulu the brother of the deceased and Seshamma, his mother in favour of the widow. The deed recites that as the widow did not desire to adopt according to the will of her husband, as per the advice of mediators and on the understanding that Subbayya Sastrulu and Seshamma should give to the sisters of the deceased the extents of land bequeathed to them under the will, the properties left by Dattatrayalu should be divided between the parties as follows: the widow to get about 6 acres and Subbayya Sastrulu to take about 5 acres 32’ cents and the house set out in Schedule C. Apparently, this deed of settlement was acted upon by the parties for a considerable time and the widow did not make any adoption. On the other hand, the parties, namely, both the widow and Subbayya Sastrulu made alienations of the portions of the property which fell to them under the deed.
It was in 1937, nearly 40 years after the date of the settlement, that the first defendant the widow purported to adopt the plaintiff on 2nd May, 1937. Now the alleged adopted son seeks to set aside the alienations made by the widow and by Subbayya Sastrulu.
Both the factum and the validity of the plaintiff’s adoption were questioned by the defendants. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the adoption of the plaintiff was true but it was not valid, because it was not in due exercise of the authority conferred on the widow by the terms of the will. He found that the authority was not strictly acted upon, because the boy Durgayya was available for adoption but was not taken in adoption. He also held that the alienations sought to be attacked by the plaintiff were valid and binding on him.
The plaintiff who is the appellant attacks the findings against him in respect of both his adoption and the alienations. On the question of adoption, we have not been referred to any direct authority. There can be no doubt that if the husband when giving authority to the widow directs that a particular boy should be adopted, the widow would have no power to make an adoption of a