Satyanarayana Rao, J.-The only question that has been referred to us by the Appellate Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Act is whether in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the partnership deed cannot be registered.

One V. M. Narayanaswami Mudaliar carried on business in handloom cloth and piece goods. In respect of this business, he was assessed as the kartha of an undivided Hindu family upto the assessment year 1941-42, In 1942 he died leaving six minor sons and a widow. During the assessment years 1942-43, and 1943-44, the income was assessed on the basis of the income of an undivided Hindu family represented by the widow, Radha Ammal. The assessment years with which we are now concerned is the year 1944-45 and the accounting year is the year ending 16th November, 1943. During the accounting year the widow entered into two partnerships in respect of the two heads of business with two different persons. One was with one Arumugha Mudaliar who was an old clerk of the firm and concerned the handloom business. In respect of piece goods business, she entered into partnership with one Govindaraja Mudaliar. We are now concerned only with the partnership relating to handloom business. This deed was presented for registration before the Income-tax authorities under section 26(a) of the Act. Under this document the widow agreed to treat Arumugha Mudaliar as a partner and she purported to act as guardian of the six minor sons. The registration of the deed was refused by the Income-tax Officer and the appeals against that order also Shared the same fate.

On this reference it was argued that the view of the Appellate Tribunal that the deed could not be registered as it was not a valid deed is not correct. It was claimed on behalf of the assessee that the widow could validly represent the minors as Kartha of the family and the learned advocate for the assessee was driven to this position as he could not argue that the mother as guardian could validly enter into a partnership with a stranger on behalf of her minor sons. This representative capacity as Kartha of the family, it was claimed, is to be inferred under the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937). Under the Act the widow of a deceased coparcener is entitled on the death of her husband to the same interest in the joint Hindu family property as the husband himself had. But the interest so devolving on the Hindu widow, under the provisions of the Act is limited to an interest known and described under Hindu law as a Hindu woman’s estate. She was, however, given a power or right to claim partition of the family properties and to get her share allotted in the same manner as a male owner. These new rights which have been created under the Act, it is urged, have effect of elevating the status of the widow and have the force of converting her status into that of a coparcener to enable her to acquire a representative capacity as a Kartha or managing member of the family. In my opinion, this view proceeds, on an entire misconception of the position of a manager under the Hindu law and upon a wrong inference from the effect produced by the Act on the rights of the widow. The right to managership under Hindu law is conferred as a general rule on the father as the head of a joint family, if alive, and if he died, the right devolved upon the senior member of the family. The right to become a manager depends-upon the fundamental fact that the person on whom the right devolved was a coparcener of the joint family. If a person is not a member of the coparcenery and is outside it, he has no right to claim the managership of the family and to claim a representative capacity on behalf of the other coparceners with reference to the dealings relating to the property of the family. Further, the right is confined to the male members of the family as the female members were not treated as coparceners though they may be members of t

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