Child means not illegitimate child.

Satyanarayana Rao, J.-The short question that is raised in this reference is whether the word “child” occurring in section 16(3)(a) of the Income-tax Act includes also an illegitimate child. The question as formulated by the Tribunal and referred to us is in these terms:

“Whether the sum of Rs. 7,236 the share income of Thyagarajan, the minor illegitimate son of the assessee, is liable to be included in the total income of the assessee under section 16(3)(a) (ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act.”

The assessee is a partner in a firm styled Rajasundaram Chetty and Sons, Madras. He has two minor children, Kalyanasundaram, a legitimate son, and Thyagarajan, an illegitimate child. Both were admitted to the benefits of the partnership and the partnership itself was registered under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act. During the accounting year ending with March 1945 the profits of the firm credited in the accounts were Rs. 308 to Kalyanasundaram and Rs. 7,236 to Thyagarajan. During the assessment year 1945-46 the Income-tax Officer added these amounts to the total income of Rajasundaram Chetty, the assessee, i.e., the father, for the purpose of assessment under section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. The assessee did not dispute the addition of the sum of Rs. 308 representing the profits of Kalyanasundaram in his total income but objected to the inclusion of the sum of Rs. 7,236 representing the profits of Thyagarajan and credited in his accounts.

The Income-tax authorities relied upon the provision in section 16(3)(a) of the Act to justify the inclusion of the sum of Rs. 7,236 on the ground that the word “child” in that section comprised within it also an illegitimate child, but this view was not accepted by the Appellate Tribunal which upheld the contention of the assessee and excluded the sum of Rs. 7,236 from the total income of Rajasundaram Chetty for the assessment year.

The only question that arises for decision therefore is whether the illegitimate child, Thyagarajan, can properly be described as “child” within the meaning of section 16(3)(a) of the Act to uphold the inclusion of the sum of Rs. 7,236. The word “child” is not defined either in the Income-tax Act or the General Clauses Act. As pointed out by Denman, C.J., in the case in The Queen v. Totley1, “the law does not contemplate illegitimacy”. The proper description of a legitimate child is “child”. Prima facie, therefore, the word “child” must be interpreted to mean a legitimate child unless there is something in the subject or context to indicate that the contrary is intended by the use of the word in the statute. The same rule of construction has been applied also in the case of wills. It has been stated by Pollock, C.B., in Dickinson v. The North Eastern Railway Co.2, that beyond all doubt in the construction of this Act of Parliament the word “child” means “legitimate child only.” He also adverts to the rule of construction applicable to wills as laid down by Hawkins which is,

“A gift to children means legitimate children only, unless it appears, from the context or from circumstances, that illegitimate children must have been intended.”

These principles of interpretation have been lucidly summarised in Lord Hailsham’s Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 17, 2nd edition, page 688 in these terms:

“In the absence of a contrary intention either expressed or deducible by necessary inference all provisions respecting ‘children ‘contained in any laws or instruments having a legal operation’ refer exclusively to legitimate children.”

In support of this statement of the law the learned author refers to the statement of Denman, C.J., already quoted and the observations of Pollock, C.J. in Dickinson’s case1. Applying these principles one is not able to find anything to indicate a contrary intention in the statute now under consideration, nor are there any circumstances which compel us to infer that the Legislature did not intend by the use of the word ‘child’ to convey its prima faci