Chief Justice.-This is an appeal by the first defendant in O.S. No. 50 of 1944 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Anantapur against a decree granting specific performance of an agreement to sell executed by the appellant and the second respondent (second defendant) on 3rd July, 1944. There is no dispute as to the execution of the agreement. The two defences in the lower court were (1) that as there were four sons of the first defendant, he could not convey anything more than his share and (2) that the breach was on the part of the plaintiff, as time was of the essence of the contract. The learned Subordinate Judge held that as the agreement did not make any reference to the sons of the first defendant or the binding nature of the alienation such pleas need not be gone into in this suit. He also held that time was not of the essence of the contract and the breach was by the defendant. He, therefore, held that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance.

The learned counsel for the appellant has pressed before us only one of the points, and that is that the suit for specific performance must fail so far as the first defendant at least is concerned, because he could not be compelled to convey his sons’ shares and the agreement to sell the entire house is not valid and binding on his sons. He cited to us, the ruling of the Full Bench in Baluswami Aiyar v. Lakshmana Aiyar1. What happened in that case was that a suit was brought by certain plaintiff to enforce specific performance of a contract to sell a house and ground in Madras made by the first defendant alone. The plaintiffs claimed that the first defendant’s son, the second defendant, who was not a party to the contract was nevertheless bound by the agreement entered into by the father, because he had assented to it and also because the sale was for the benefit of the family. These pleas were denied, and the learned trial Judge held that the pleas were not established, and the suit was dismissed against the son. The question for decision was whether in such circumstances specific performance could be decreed against the first defendant alone, and if it could be, on what terms. The learned Judge’s answer to the question was that specific performance could not be granted of the contract so as to direct execution of the conveyance of the entire property but it was open to the purchaser to get specific performance so far as the share of the vendor was concerned on payment of the consideration agreed upon without any abatement. It will be noticed that the facts are entirely different in this case.

There is no allegation in the plaint that the agreement to sell executed by the first defendant was binding on his sons. In fact, the plaint does not make any reference to any sons of the first defendant. The plaint contains the bare allegation of the execution of the agreement by the defendants and the usual allegations of default on the part of the defendants and the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the contract. To such a case as this, the following observations of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in Baluswami Iyer v. Lakshmana Aiyar1directly apply,

“Where a person sues for specific performance of an agreement to convey and simply impleads the party bound to carry out the agreement there is no necessity to determine the question of the vendor’s title, and the fact that the title which the purchaser may acquire might be defeasible by a third party is no ground for refusing specific performance if the purchaser is willing to take such title as the vendor has. But where a party seeking specific performance seeks to bind the interests of persons not parties to the contract, alleging grounds which under Hindu law would bind their interests and enable the vendor to give a good title as against them and makes them parties, it is difficult to see how the question as to the right of the contracting party to convey any interest except his own can be avoi