Lord Porter.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, dated 5th October, 1946, which reversed the judgment of the High Court of Zanzibar given in favour of the appellant and dismissed her action with costs.

The appellant claimed that she was the daughter of Hafidh bin Muhammad el-Busaidi (hereinafter called Hafidh) and of his slave concubine Panya and as such, under the law of the Ibadhi sect of which her parents were members, to be entitled to her share of her father’s estate.

Her mother was originally the slave of Hafidh’s mother, Binti Juma, and was said to have been given by her as a slave concubine or “suria” to her son.

It is common ground that in order to establish such a claim it must be proved, (1) that the mother was given to the father as a concubine and slave, (2) that by reason of the gift the woman given must have ceased to be the slave of the original owner and have become the slave of the man to whom she was given (3) that she must have been accepted by him as such, (4) that the claimant was the daughter of this union, and (5) that the alleged father must have recognised her as his daughter.

The evidence was conflicting upon all these points, but certain facts were found by the learned Chief Justice of Zanzibar and were in substance accepted by the Appellate Court. In these circumstances their Lordships would naturally follow these findings both because they are concurrent and because they represent the view of the Court which saw and heard the witnesses.

These facts are (1) that Binti Juma had given Panya as his slave concubine to Hafidh, (2) that he had accepted her in that capacity, and (3) that the appellant was the offspring of that union.

The learned Chief Justice also found that by his conduct Hafidh had acknowledged the appellant as his daughter but this last finding is not a direct finding of fact but is derived partly from an inference drawn from the facts and partly from the law applicable to the circumstances.

As to the law Mr. Gahan contended that the appellant would establish her case if an acknowledgment of paternity could legitimately be drawn either from an actual admission or from the facts proved in evidence; Mr. Dingle Foot for the respondent on the other hand maintained that a mere admission of paternity would not be enough, there must be something from which an acknowledgment of the appellant as one of those entitled to share in his estate could be inferred and in any case the acknowledgment must be clear and could not be derived from inconclusive circumstances. In regard to these contentions, their Lordships are not prepared to accept the view that anything more than an acknowledgment of paternity is required.

It is true that in cases where the question to be determined is whether there has been a marriage between the parents, something more than a mere acknowledgment of paternity is required. This principle is clearly stated in the head note to the judgment of the Board delivered by Lord Macnaghten in Abdool Razack v. Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem1, in the words:

“The Mahomedan doctrine of legitimacy by acknowledgment does not apply to every case of admission of paternity: an intention to confer the status of legitimacy must be found or presumed.”

But the reason for this doctrine, as has been pointed out in that case and in the other two cases cited to their Lordships, viz., Ashruffood Owlah Ahmed Hossein Khan v. Hyder Hossein Khan2 and Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf Ali Chowdhury3, is to be found in the possibility under Moslem law of proving the existence of a valid marriage in cases where no ceremony has been performed but evidence is adduced from which it appears that the parties intended to be united in the marriage bond. The mere admission of paternity in no way establishes anything but a casual union and more is required to show the existence of the marriage bond if the existence of that bond is to be derived from association alone without any p