Subba Rao, J.-This is an application under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner is an advocate of this Court. On the 1st April, 1948, the Commissioner of Police passed an order of detention under section 2(1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (Act I of 1947). He was duly authorised by the Provincial Government to exercise its powers under section 2(1) of the said Act. In the detention order it is stated that the petitioner is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that with a view to preventing him from so doing, it is necessary to detain him. The Commissioner of Police communicated the said order to the Government under section 2(2) on the 9th June, 1948. On the nth September, 1948, the Government served the grounds of detention on the petitioner. Though the order of detention was passed on 1st April, 1948, the petitioner was arrested only on 17th August, 1948, as presumably his whereabouts were not known till that date.

Mr. A.K. Pillai, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised before us the following four points: (1) that the order of the Commissioner dated 1st April, 1948, was invalid; (2) that though the order was valid when passed, it became invalid in view of the non-compliance with some of the mandatory provisions of the statute; (3) that though the detention in its origin was valid the detention of the petitioner subsequent to the contravention of the mandatory provisions of the statute was illegal; and (4) that the Government in detaining the petitioner was actuated by mala fides.

There is no force in the learned counsel’s first argument. Section 2(1) reads as follows:

“The Provincial Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order and with a view to preventing him, it is necessary so to do, may make an order:-

(a) directing that he be detained . . . . . . . . .”

As aforesaid this power of the Government was delegated to the Commissioner under section 15 of the Act. The Commissioner states in the detention order in clear terms that the petitioner is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that with a view to preventing him from so doing it is necessary to detain him. The order is in strict compliance with the provisions of section 2(1) and is therefore clearly valid.

There are no merits in the second point either. If the order was valid at its inception, we cannot see how it would become invalid by the subsequent noncompliance with the other provisions of the Act. The argument was that the order passed under section 2(1) was not complete till it was communicated to the Government in strict compliance with the provisions of section 2(2). By sub-section (2) when any order is made under sub-section (1) by an officer or authority empowered under section 15, that officer or authority shall forthwith report the fact to the Provincial Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of such officer or authority, have a bearing on the necessity for or expediency of the order. Though the order of detention was passed on 1st April, 1948, the Commissioner communicated the same to the Government on 9th June, 1948, i.e., after ten weeks. In Crl.M.P.No.1309 of 19481 we differed on the interpretation of the word ‘forthwith’ in the said section. Assuming that in view of this enormous delay, it must be held that the provisions of the section have not been strictly complied with, would it have the effect of invalidating an’ order that had been validly passed. We think not. Once an order had been passed in strict compliance with the provisions of section 2(1), it was validly passed. Sections 2(2) and 3(1) were designed to provide a machinery for the person against whom the order has been passed to seek redress as early as possible. If a statutory a