Horwill, J.-In this application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the order of this Court1 dismissing as not maintainable an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Tellicherry removing the petitioner from receivership and appointing two others, it has been argued that the petitioner has the right to appeal either under section 109(a) or section 109(c), Civil Procedure Code.

As for the first contention that the order passed by us was a final order, it is sufficient to state that a final order contemplated under section 109(a) must be one which affects finally the rights of parties. An order removing or appointing a receiver does not affect at all the rights of the parties; it is merely an order making provision for the due preservation of the estate during the pendency of the suit. This is such a well-recognised principle of law that authority for this proposition should hardly be necessary. We therefore content ourselves with referring to Rajnithi v. Nrisingha1 , in which after a full discussion of the various decisions it was held that an order appointing or removing a receiver was not a final order.

If the order is not a final order then an appe