The petitioner is the plaintiff, a merchant of Bezwada, who sued the Nizam State Railway of Hyderabad for the

recovery of Rs. 305 being the value of some machinery he consigned on 21st August, 1944, from Bezwada to the

Circar Engineering Company, Lahore. It is common ground that the goods had to be carried over three railways.

Plaintiff received from the consignee a letter Exhibit P-1 dated 7th November, 1944, to the effect that the goods had not

reached him. He sent a notice to the railway company on 8th February 1945, complaining that the goods had not been

delivered and asking for payment of their value. To this letter he was not vouchsafed any reply. He then, after going

through the necessary formalities, filed this suit on 31st October, 1945. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed it as

time barred under Article 31 of the Limitation Act which prescribes as the period of limitation for a suit against a carrier

for compensation, non-delivery or delay in delivering goods one year from the date “when the goods ought to be

delivered”. The learned Subordinate Judge attached importance to the evidence of a parcels clerk of the Bezwada

railway station who deposed that it would normally take one week by passenger train and 15 days by goods train for a

consignment to reach Lahore. On this basis the Subordinate Judge held that the suit was filed out of time. The view

taken by him is obviously incorrect and cannot be suported.

Two limitation Articles which can govern this case are Article 30 which prescribes for suits against a carrier for

compensation for losing or injuring goods. one year from the date when the loss or injury occurred. In Madras and

Southern Mahratla Railway Co. v. Bhimappa1, a Bench of this Court observed as regards Article 30 that the burden of

proving when the goods were lost is on the railway company and that in that case they had not proved when they were

lost and there was nothing in the evidence to show that they were lost more than one year before the institution of the

suit. Those observations are relevant and pertinent to the facts of the present suit. As regards Article 31, the difficulty it

raises is that it fixes no specific time for the delivery of the goods, the ordinary rule being that goods have to be delivered

by a carrier within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time has to depend on the facts of each case. In Jugal

Kishore v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway2, the plaintiff consigned goods on the 28th August, 1918, and filed his suit

for damages on the 31st March, 1920. For more than a year plaintiff had been put off by various statements on the part

of the railway companies to the effect that the matter was being enquired into. It was held that the suit was in time and

not barred, whether Article 30, or Article 31 was considered applicable to the facts. That suit was filed about a year

and eight months after the consignment, whereas the present suit was filed less than one year and three months after the

consignment. The learned Subordinate Judge relied on Palanichami Nadar v. Governor-General of India in Council3 for

the position that time would begin to run under Article 31 from the date of a definite refusal or declaration or inability by

the railway company to deliver the lost goods. But that construction of Article 31 has been obviously misapplied by the

learned Subordinate Judge to the facts of this suit. In the cases in which that construction was given, it merely enlarged

the period within which a suit should be brought from the date on which, after a protracted correspondence with the

railway company, they expressed inability to give delivery of the goods for some reason or other. In the present case,

the railway company did not even accord the plaintiff the courtesy of a reply to his original letter of complaint. In fact the

decision in Palanichami Nadar v. GovernorGeneral of India in Council3 gives very strong support following as it does,

Jugal Kishore v. Great Indian P