This is an appeal from the order of the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, dismissing an execution petition, E.P. No. 1109 of 1946 on the file of his Court.

The relevant facts are these:

The property which forms the subject-matter of this controversy is a nonresidential building in Besant Road, Triplicane. On 29th May, 1946, the landlord obtained from the House Rent Controller appointed under the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945, an order for the eviction of the tenant who was then in occupation of the premises. The tenant preferred an appeal to the Collector of Madras which was dismissed on 15th July, 1946. On 2nd August, 1946, the landlord applied to the City Civil Court for execution of the order of eviction that had been made in his favour. On the very same day, namely, 2nd August, 1946, the tenant presented a revision petition to the Government which he was entitled to do under the Madras House Rent Control Order. This order ceased to be in force on 30th September, 1946, and its place was taken by the Madras Act XV of 1946. On 13th March, 1947, that is to say, after the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945 had ceased to be in force and the Madras Act XV of 1946 had taken its place the Provincial Government allowed the revision petition of the tenant. When this fact was brought to his notice the learned Judge in the City Civil Court dismissed the execution petition. Against that order the landlord now appeals.

The principal argument put forward on behalf of the landlord is that on 13th March, 1947, when the Government passed the order allowing the revision petition of the tenant they had no power to do so since the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945 which alone conferred on them the requisite power was no longer in force. In substance the argument was that the source from which the Government derived their power had dried up, and that, therefore, their order was incompetent. In this connection reference was made to certain passages in Craies "Statute Law," 4th edition at page 347, where the learned author says,

"As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect

..... In Spencer v. Hooton1, Roche, J., held that he had no jurisdiction to hear appeals from. Munitions Tribunals in proceedings taken under the Wages (Temporary Regulations) Acts by reason of the Act giving him jurisdiction having expired before the appeals came on for hearing. There is a difference between the effect of expiration of a temporary Act and the repeal of a perpetual Act."

In support of his contentions the learned advocate for the appellant also relied on the decision in Canada Cement Co. v. East Montreal (Town of)2. That was a case in which a Tribunal to which appeals previously lay was abolished and another constituted in its place. The Privy Council held that an appeal did not lie to the new Tribunal. Their Lordships observed,

"This appeal had not been brought when the statute was passed, although the proceedings. before the circuit Court had been instituted. Consequently, the Statutes giving whatever right of appeal may have existed were replaced by sections which gave none."

For the other side it was contended that by 30th September, 1946, when the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945 ceased to be in force the tenant had already acquired a vested right to move the Government in revision and that there is nothing in the language of Act XV of 1946 taking away that right. The decisions in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Inspector of Police, Mayavaram3and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving4were also relied on. In the former case the question was whether. a person who had been ordered to be detained under Madras Act 1 of 1947 and who had preferred an application to the High Court under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, before Madras Ordinance II of 1948 had been promulgated, had a right