Horwill J.-The plaintiffs, who were the owners or lessees of a picture house, sued to evict from it the defendants, who were partners of the third defendant in the conducting of the cinema business in the picture house. The defendants resisted the suit mainly on the ground that they were entitled under Act XV of 1946 (the Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act) to remain in possession since they satisfied the definition of “tenants” found in section 2(4) of that Act. They had no lease deed in their favour; but they sought to support their claim by contending that by virtue of the partnership, they had entered into with the lessee (the third plaintiff) with the express consent of the first plaintiff, there was either an equitable assignment of the lease (Exhibit A-6) by the third plaintiff in favour of the partnership of themselves and the third plaintiff or that this lease in favour of the third plaintiff must be regarded as a lease to the partnership. These and other points were considered by the learned District Judge and decided in favour of the plaintiffs. A further important issue in the suit was with regard to the quantum of damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The learned Judge passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for damages at the rate of Rs. 200 a day from the date when the lease in favour of the third plaintiff expired to the date when the defendants might hand over possession to the new lessees, plaintiffs 3 to 7. In appeal, we agreed with the lower court that the defendants obtained no right as lessees and were not tenants within the meaning of section 2(4) of Act XV of 1946, and that upon the expiry of the lease in favour of the third plaintiff, the defendants became trespassers and were bound to pay damages to the plaintiffs. With regard to the quantum of damages, we however modified the decree of the lower Court in the defendants’ favour in three ways. In the first place, we found that the rate of Rs. 200 a day was excessive and decreased it to Rs. 50 a day. We also held that for two short periods, the non-working of the cinema was due to the acts of the plaintiffs themselves and that for those periods the defendants were not therefore liable for any damages at all. The third modification of the lower Court’s decree on the question of damages was that we held that while the business was being conducted by the first defendant alone, or by him in conjunction with the fourth plaintiff, no damages could be awarded; for the first defendant, as receiver, was bound to account to the court for the actual profits made and that the amount due to the plaintiffs for the periods in which the receiver was or the reivers were conducting the cinema, the profits would have to be ascertained by the court in execution. The question is whether the defendants are entitled to leave to appeal to the Federal Court against our decree, since the value of the subject-matter of the suit and appeal exceeds Rs. 10,000, and our decree is not one affirming in its entirety the decree of the lower court.

It is seen that the only modifications made in the decree of the lower court were in favour of the defendants; and in those respects in which we have modified the decree of the lower court in the defendants’ favour, there is no ground for appeal to the Federal Court.

The question whether an appeal to the Privy Council where the variation of the decree of the trial court by the appellate court is in favour of the person who seeks to appeal to the Privy Council lies or not has been considered in several cases of this court. Those which seem most relevant to the case here under consideration are Venkitaswami v. Sekkutti1, Velayya v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board2, K.V. Pandian v. Rev. Pignot3and Lakshmanan v. Thangam4. In the first of these cases, the trial court passed a decree against defendants I and 4 for the full amount claimed in the plaint; but against defendants 2 and 3 the decree was for a lesser amount than th