The Chief Justice.-These two applications for issue of writs of certiorari arise in respect of the same subject-matter, namely, Premises No.118, China Bazaar Road, Madras. The petitioner is the landlord, the contesting respondent is the tenant. The petitioner filed two successive applications before the Rent Controller, Madras, for eviction. The first application was on the ground that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent for February, March and April, 1948. The other application was on the ground that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent for July, August and September, 1948. The Rent Controller passed orders of eviction on both the applications, and there were two appeals to the Court of Small Causes. Both the appeals were allowed by the learned Third Judge of that Court, on practically the same reasoning. The landlord has filed the above two applications to quash the two orders of the learned Judge.

It is sufficient to state the following facts for the disposal of these applications. The relit of the premises for January was payable by the end of February 1948. A telegraphic money order for the rent of January was apparently despatched by the tenant on 29th February, 1948, from Baroda, but actually the money order was delivered to the petitioner only on 1st March, 1948, when he refused to accept it. Thereafter, there is no finding that the tenant made any tender of the rent due for any of the subsequent months, February onwards. On these facts, the learned Judge held (1) that there was a valid tender of the rent for January, and an unjustifiable refusal by the landlord and (2) that, because of this unjustifiable refusal, it was not necessary in law for the tenant to go on tendering, month after month, the rent due for each month. According to the learned Judge, in these circumstances, the tenant could not be considered to be a. defaulter in respect of the rent due for the months, February to April and July to September, 1948.

We shall assume for the purpose of argument that the refusal by the landlord on 1st March, 1948, to accept the money was an unreasonable and unjustifiable refusal of a valid tender made by the tenant, though if we were compelled to give our decision on that question we would have been inclined to hold that it was not an improper refusal. The question remains whether by reason of the improper refusal of the rent for January, the tenant is exempted from the obligation to tender the rent for the succeeding months within the time limited by law. Under section 7(2)(i) of Madras Act XV of 1946, a landlord is entitled to an order for eviction of the tenant, if the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. It cannot be said that, merely because the rent due for one month has been improperly refused when tendered, the rent for succeeding months is neither due nor payable. It is clear that under the above provision of the Act, the duty is cast on the tenant to make a payment or tender for every month, if he desires to take advantage of the provisions of the Act. We are not concerned in this case with the contingency of the landlord intimating to the tenant his intention not to receive the rent, even if tendered. Having regard to the facts of this case, it is unnecessary to deal at any length with the decisions cited to us by the learned counsel for the respondent, namely, Chelikani Venkatarayanim v. Zamindar of Tuni1 , Bhagwantulayya v. Venkandhora2 and Harnath Raibinjraj v. Hirdyanarain3 , because all these decisions lay down the well-known proposition which was enunciated by Wigram, V.C., in the leading case of Hunter v. Daniel4, that where there has been an unequivocal refusal to accept a tender, the law does not require a tender to be made. Those cases dealt with cases of mortgages and contracts, and with the particular incidents of tender, default in which w