This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for a decree restraining the defendant-respondent by an injunction from interfering with the appellant’s right to the suit land and for a declaration that he is entitled to the reliefs provided under Madras Act III of 1922 (Madras City Tenants Protection Act) The appellant’s father was granted a lease of a plot of land measuring 180 square feet in Perambur within the city of Madras. This was in the year 1917 and the monthly rent was Rs. 5. After the death of the father successive leases were granted by the respondent from time to time. In 1934., the appellant requested the Government to assign the land to him but the Government refused. A similar request was made in 1935 and that again was turned down. In May, 1941, the respondent terminated the lease on the ground that one of the conditions of the lease was violated and that the lease contained a provision for forfeiture and re-entry. The lease that was current at that time was that under Ex. D-23 which ran from 1st July, 1938 up to the 30th June, 1941. A notice informing the appellant that his lease was forfeited and asking him to quit was given on the 14th May, 1941, Ex. D-24. The Collector also ordered the Tahsildar to take immediate action to evict the lessee and to re-enter upon the land. The Tahsildar took possession of the land on the 27th July, 1941. The Tahsildar has given evidence to this effect and his evidence has been accepted by the lower Court. Though the appellant denies that the Tahsildar took possession on the 27th July, 1941, I see no reason to differ from the finding of the lower Court on this question.

On the 30th July, 1941, the karnam accepted a sum of Rs. 5 and gave a receipt Ex. P-13(b). It purports to be a receipt for the lease rent for the month of July, 1941. Subsequently there were proceedings under the Land Encroachment Act and when the proceedings were going on, the suit under appeal was started on the 1st July, 1941, for the reliefs mentioned above. It would appear that subsequent to the date of the plaint, the superstructure put up by the appellant was removed by the respondent and thereafter damages were asked as regards the value of the buildings. Various claims were put forward in the plaint; one is that the appellant is a tenant under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and therefore entitled to the benefits conferred by that Act. Under section 2(4) of the Act, a tenant means

"tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person deriving title from him, and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy."

If this Act applies, then the appellant cannot be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of that Act and he would be entitled to a declaration that the respondent should not disturb his possession except by proceedings under that Act. But the respondent relies upon section 3 of the Crown Grants Act which says-that notwithstanding anything contained in any statute or enactment of the Legislature, the terms of the grant should be given effect to. The section runs thus:

" All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant of transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature to the contrary notwithstanding."

It is clear therefore thai the Crown Grants Act prevails over the City Tenants Protection Act and that being so, the terms of the grant Ex. D-23 have to be enforced-Ex. D-23 provides that the lease comes to an end on the expiry of the three years from that date. It contains this stipulation:

Clause 2, sub-clause (9). "And at the expiration or sooner determination of the said vacancy to yield up the demised premises with the fixtures and additions thereto in good and tenantable repair and condition in accordance with the covenants hereinbefore contained."

Therefore, the lessee-appellant is bound by the covena