Judgment.-The short question for decision in this appeal is whether the respondent forfeits her right to property which she obtained under a deed of settlement Exhibit P-1 executed in her favour by the appellant on 7th June, 1938. The appellant Bangaru Reddi and one Sundara Reddi were undivided brothers. The plaintiff-respondent was married to Sundara Reddi in August, 1937. Unfortunately, Sundara Reddi died in April, 1938, leaving the plaintiff (still a minor) a widow. The deed in question was executed by the appellant in favour of the minor respondent represented by her guardian and father one Govinda Reddi. In September, 1941, the plaintiff married one Viswanatha Reddi. In December, 1941, the appellant issued a notice to her alleging that she had forfeited her right to the property settled on her on account of her re-marriage. The respondent was compelled to file the suit out of which this second appeal arises in respect of one of the items of property for a declaration that the property belongs to her and for possession free from the obstruction of the defendant. The learned District Munsiff dismissed the suit but on appeal the learned District Judge has granted a decree in her favour. The first defendant appeals.

The learned advocate for the appellant first contended that under section 2 of the Hindu Widows’ Re-marriage Act (XV of 1856) the plaintiff forfeited her right to the property. Section 2 runs as follows:

“All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband’s property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission, to re-marry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her remarriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same.”

It is clear that this section has no effect on property belonging to the widow absolutely on the date of the re-marriage. The rights and interests which she may have in her deceased husband’s property by way of maintenance obviously refer to recurring rights as for example to payment of maintenance by the enforcement of a charge on her deceased husband’s property. In the case of wills and other testamentary dispositions it is only the limited interest that ceases and determines. In my opinion the words, “as if she had then died” supply the criterion for adjudicating on the rights and disabilities of the widow on re-marriage. All the results which would follow the re-marriage are results which would ensue if she had died on the date of the re-marriage. In other words, if she had only a limited and life interest then that would cease; but if she had an absolute estate that would not cease. In fact, the learned advocate for the appellant very properly did not lay such stress on this section in support of his case.

The next contention was that under the settlement deed the property must be deemed to have continued to form part of her husband’s estate and the widow did not have a full and absolute estate, an estate which for example would be taken after her by her stridhana heirs.

Two decisions were relied on by him but before I deal with them it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the deed itself. The document recites the marriage of the plaintiff and the death of her husband and the fact that she is entitled to get maintenance from the family of the settlor, and that it had been arranged by mediators that certain properties mentioned therein belonging to the executant should be settled on her. The document then goes on to say:

“You shall take these properties and enjoy them from this day onwards till you attain majority and shall after you attain majority hold and enjoy them absolutely with powers of alienation by way of gift, exchange, sale,

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