1946 Supreme(Mad) 258
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Sir Sidney Wadsworth, Officiating Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Govindarajachari,JJ.
Desu Rattamma
Versus
Mothey Narayana Rao
Appeal No. 515 of 1944.
Decided On : 28 October 1946
V. Viyyanna for Appellant.
T. V. Ramanatha Aiyar and V. S. Narasimhachar for Respondents.
The first defendant borrowed Rs. 5,000 from the plaintiff on the 25th April, 1927, and executed a promissory note in her favour. The promissory note, Ex. P-3, stated that the sum was borrowed “for my benefit, i.e., for my business.” This promissory note was renewed by another dated the 25th April, 1930, Ex. P-2, which was also for Rs. 5,000, the interest which accrued under Ex. P-3, having been paid from time to time. Ex. P-2 referred to Ex. P-3 as a promissory note previously executed and delivered “for my benefit,” the maker of Ex. P-2 being again the first defendant. On the 25th August, 1931, the first defendant for himself and as guardian of the second defendant, his aurasa son whom he had given in adoption to his undivided paternal uncle, executed a deed of simple mortgage, Ex. P-1, for Rs. 5,700 made up of Rs. 5,639-10-0, being the principal and interest due under Ex. P-2 and a small cash advance of Rs. 60-6-0, hypothecating some of the family properties. The plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of Rs. 10,000 after having given up Rs. 4,929-13-0 out of the amount of principal and interest due under Ex. P-1 on the date of suit. The principal contest was by the second defendant. It was alleged by him that he and the first defendant had ceased to be members of a joint Hindu family even before 1927, that the amount for which Ex. P-3 was executed was borrowed for a business started by the first defendant and that the first defendant could not give a valid mortgage of the second defendant’s share in the family property, for such a debt, assuming that the first and second defendants were members of a joint Hindu family in 1927 and 1931. The lower Court gave a decree to the plaintiff against the first defendant’s share in the hypotheca but dismissed the suit as against the second defendant. It held that the first and second defendants were members of an undivided Hindu family in 1927 and 1931 but that the business for which the suit debt was borrowed was a new business started by the first defendant for which he could not as manager of a joint Hindu family create a valid mortgage over the share of the second defendant, a minor undivided coparcener.
The finding that the first and second defendants were undivided at all material times has not been challenged before us on behalf of the second defendant, who is the second respondent in this appeal. The argument before us related only to the finding of the lower Court regarding the character of the business for which the amount was borrowed. It is argued for the plain tiff-appellant that the first and second defendants belong to a Vysia family whose hereditary avocation or kulachara is trade or commerce, that the suit debt was borrowed for the purpose of a business which should be regarded as an extension of a previously existing family business and that it is therefore within the competence of the first defendant as manager of such a family to mortgage the family property for such a debt including the share of the second defendant. Alternatively, it is argued that the plaintiff made a bona fide inquiry regarding the purpose of the loan and was satisfied on such inquiry that the first defendant was borrowing the money for a purpose binding on the family and that in this view also the mortgage is enforceable against the second defendant’s share in the hypotheca.
It may be stated at the outset that it is established by the evidence of D.W.1 and P. W. 3 that the amount of Rs. 5,000 was borrowed under Ex. P-3 principally, if not wholly, for a cashew-nut business which was being conduct