The Chief Justice.-These two appeals are from a judgment of Bell, J., delivered in a second appeal. Appeal No. 51 of 1945 has been filed by the holder of a mortgage decree and Appeal No. 53 of 1945, by the purchaser of the property at the sale held by the Court in execution.

The mortgage was executed by a Hindu father on behalf of himself and his three minor sons. They constituted a joint family. On the 24th June, 1935, in O.S. No. 91 of 1935, of the Court of the District Munsiff of Kumbakonam, the mortgagee obtained a preliminary decree and on the 13th November, 1935, a final decree. The price realised for the hypotheca in execution fell short of the amount due under the decree by Rs. 308-4-0. On the 7th January, 1941, the decree-holder filed an application for a personal decree against the father and his two surviving sons, limited so far as the sons were concerned to their interests in the family estate. One of the sons had died before the application was filed. One of the two surviving sons (the first respondent in these appeals) was a minor. The decree-holder experienced some difficulty in serving the first respondent and on the 30th July, 1941, he filed a memorandum indicating his intention of withdrawing the application for a personal decree so far as the first respondent was concerned. It would appear that by this time the first respondent had become a major. As the result of the decree-holder having decided to withdraw the application against the first respondent a personal decree was passed against the father and his other surviving son, limited, of course, so far as the latter was concerned to his interests in the family property.

The decree-holder then applied to execute the personal decree by the attachment of certain family properties. The attachment was ordered and the properties were in due course sold. Within a month of the sale the first respondent applied to the Court of the District Munsiff of Kumbakonam for an order setting aside the sale in so far as it affected his one-third share in the properties. The District Munsiff dismissed the application on the ground that the pious obligation rule of Hindu Law applied. The first respondent appealed to the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam without success. The Subordinate Judge held that the case was governed by Krishnan v. Sami1. The first respondent then appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard by Bell, J., who considered that the governing authority was Venkataranga Reddi v. Chinna Sithamma2and consequently allowed the appeal, but he gave leave to appeal.

We consider that the Subordinate Judge rightly held that this case fell within Krishnan v. Sami1. It was there held that where a decree was obtained against a Hindu father, it could be executed against the interests of his sons in the joint estate, notwithstanding that they had been dismissed from the suit. It was argued that in Raja Ram v. Raja Baksh Singh3, the Privy Council had overruled the judgments of the Full Bench of this Court in Periaswami Mudaliar v. Seetharam Chettiar4, but this contention was rejected and the Court followed Periaswami v. Vaithilingam Pillai5(Varadachariar and Pandrang Row, JJ.) and Doraiswami v. Nagaswami6 (Coutts-Trotter, C.J. and Pakenham Walsh, J.) where it was held that the withdrawal of the suit against the sons does not exonerate them from liability under the pious obligation rule.

As the question now under discussion may perhaps arise again we would emphasise what the Privy Council actually decided in Raja Ram v. Raja Baksh Singh1 . There two members of a joint Hindu family, Badri Singh and Chandika Singh, executed a mortgage in favour of the appellant. On the 25th August, 1930, the mortgagee brought a suit to enforce the mortgage. By that time Badri Singh had died, but his two sons and five grandsons were joined as defendants as his legal representatives. The grandsons were dismissed from the suit. A decree was obtained against the other defendants and in the execution pro

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