(1953) 2 MLJ 630 (Mad)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Present : Mr. Justice Subba Rao and Mr. Justice Balakrishna Ayyar.
Case Number(s) : W.P.No.357 of 1953.
Judgement Date : Tuesday 12th of May 1953
P.G. Brookes, Receiver appointed by the Trustees for the mortgagee-debenture-holders of the Madras Electric Tramways (1904), Ltd .....Appellant(s)
Versus
The Industrial Tribunal, Madras and others .....Respondent(s)
This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuing to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, a writ of certiorari calling for the records in I.A.No.32 of 1953 and for quashing the same.
The Madras Electric Tramways (1904), Ltd., hereinafter called the “Company” was constituted to serve the City of Madras with a tramway system. By an indenture, dated 13th October, 1924 and two subsequent supplemental deeds dated, 26th March, 1925 and 6th July, 1950, respectively, all the properties and assets immoveable and moveable and the undertaking of the company were mortgaged and charged to the Beaver Trust Limited, being the trustees for the debenture-holders of the company to secure the repayment of all principal moneys and interest due on debentures. The said tramway undertaking was notified by the Government as a public utility service. By G.O.No.5555, dated 30th December, 1952, the following disputes between the company and the workmen were referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras:
(1) the fixation of the age of retirement and the quantum of gratuity payable to the persons retired from service;
(2) fixation of the quantum of bonus for 1949, 1950 and 1951;
(3) justification of the discharge of two workers and the relief they are entitled to; and
(4) the validity of the promotion of some conductors to the post of Inspectors.
At the time of the reference the petitioner P.G. Brookes was the Managing Director of the company. In that capacity he took part in the proceedings before the tribunal. On 30th March, 1953, i.e., three months after the reference and during the pendency of the proceedings before the arbitrator, he tendered his resignation Of his office as Managing Director of the company from 1st April, 1953. His resignation was accepted by the Board of Directors of the company on 9th April, 1953. The trustees in pursuance of the powers conferred on them by the aforesaid Indenture deed and the supplemental deeds appointed him as a receiver of the properties of the company from 1st April, 1953. On 17th April, 1953, the second respondent, The Madras Electric Tramways Employees’ Union by its Secretary, filed an application, being I.A.No.32 of 1953, before the first respondent to implead the receiver as a party respondent to the adjudication proceedings. In the petition filed for impleading the receiver it was stated that the receiver had stepped in and taken possession of the whole of the company’s assets including land, buildings, stores, tram cars, cash, etc., that some of the issues pending before the tribunal involved financial commitments and that therefore the receiver who had taken over the assets of the company should be rendered liable under the award that might be passed in the case. The receiver filed a counter-affidavit denying that he was either a necessary or a proper party to the proceedings and stating that the tribunal had no power or jurisdiction to add him as a party to the adjudication. The tribunal negatived his contentions and made him a party to the proceedings in the dispute before it. The tribunal gave the following two reasons for impleading him as a party: (1) the question whether by reason of the receiver’s appointment the rights obtained by the workers under the award would be defeated, and if so, how far, had to be determined and it could only be done fully and effectively in the presence of the receiver; and (2) if the receiver is not on record the workers would not be able to enforce the award against him without further proceedings. It expressed the view that section 18(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act gave it power to make him a party to the proceedings.
The aforesaid petition was filed to quash the said order.
Learned counsel for the receiver contended that there were serious errors of law apparent on the face of the order of the tribunal and that the tribunal acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction. His argument may be summarised thus: The jurisdiction of the Indus
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