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1953 Supreme(Mad) 200

(1953) 2 MLJ 257 (Mad)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Present : M. Patanjali Sastri, Chief Justice, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, Ghulam Hasan and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.
Case Number(s) : Petition No.69 of 1953.
Judgement Date : Friday 22nd of May 1953
Nain Sukh Das and others .....Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of U.P. and others .....Respondent(s)

Advocates:
S.C. Isaacs, Senior Advocate (Jai Prasad Agarwal, Advocate, with him) for Petitioners.
K.B. Asthana, Advocate for Respondent No.1 and S.P. Sinha, Senior Advocate (R. Patnaik, Advocate, with him) for Respondent No. 4.

Elections on the basis of separate electorates for members offends against Articles 15(1).

Headnote:Constitution of India-Articles 15(1) and 14 -Offending of the provisions of Article 15(1) due to holding of elections on basis of separate electorates for members of different communications.

Patanjali Sastri, C.J.-

This is an application under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking protection of the petitioners’ fundamental right under Article 15(1) against alleged violation thereof by the respondents.

The petitioners are three residents of Etah in Uttar Pradesh. They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on 2nd November, 1951, 8th December, 1951 and 17th March, 1952, at which respondents 4, 11 and 12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as those by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. They also allege that the nomination of respondent No. 3 as a member, of the Board by the Government was an illegal exercise of its powers, as the interest which that respondent was nominated to represent in the Board was already sufficiently represented. The petitioners accordingly pray for the issue of writs of quo warranto, mandamus, and other appropriate writs or directions to respondents 3, 4, 11 and 12 to show under what authority they are acting as members of the Board and to prevent them from acting as such members. The petitioners also ask for writs on the District Magistrate and the Civil Judge of Etah, respondents 2 and 13 respectively, directing them not to hold or permit the holding of any meeting of the Board which is said to be illegally constituted.

Now, it cannot be seriously disputed that any law providing for elections on the basis of separate electorates for members of different religious communities offends against Article 15(1) of the Constitution which runs thus:

“15. (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.”

This constitutional mandate to the State not to discriminate against any citizen on the ground, inter alia, of religion clearly extends to political as well as to other rights, and any election held after the Constitution in pursuance of such a law subject to clause (4) must be held void as being repugnant to the Constitution. But the question is whether the petitioners are now entitled to the relief they seek in this application under Article 32.

It is true, as pointed out in the Cross Roads case1, that Article 32 provides, in some respects, for a more effective remedy through this Court than Article 226 does through the High Courts. But the scope of the remedy is clearly narrower in that it is restricted solely to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Any right, for instance, which the petitioners may have as rate-payers in the Municipality to insist that the Board should be legally constituted and that respondents 3, 4, 11 and 12, who are not properly elected or nominated members, should not be permitted to take part in the proceedings of the Board, is outside the purview of Article 32, as such right, even if it exists, is not a fundamental right conferred by Part III. Petitioners’ learned counsel, however, contended that the fundamental right conferred by Article 15(1) on the petitioners as citizens of India was violated by the elections in question having been held on a basis which discriminated against the petitioners on the ground of their religion in that it precluded them from exercising their franchise in relation to all the candidates and from contesting the elections without regard to the reservation of seats on communal basis. Learned counsel also submitted that the delimitation of the constituencies on communal lines was a denial of equality to the petitioners in the matter of their political rights and in that respect also infringed their fundamental right under Article 14. We are unable to accede to these contentions.

It is plain that the fundamental right conferred by Article 15(1) is conferred on a citizen as an individual and is a guarantee against






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