Maintainability of appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent.

The Chief Justice.-The respondents in this appeal instituted in the Original Side of this Court a suit, C.S.No.400 of 1949, for the recovery of a sum of Rs.10,731-13-0 together with interest due thereon up to date of payment from the appellants. They filed the suit under Order 7 of the Original Side Rules which corresponds to Order 37 of the Code of Civil ‘Procedure. The suit was instituted on the judgment of a foreign court (the District court of Jodhpur) which the plaintiffs had obtained against the defendants. The appellants took out two applications before the Master, namely, an application for leave to defend and an application for treating the suit as an ordinary suit. We are not concerned in this appeal with the former application as it remains still undisposed of. The Master allowed the latter application holding that a suit based on a foreign judgment did not fall within the class of suits included under Order 7, rule 1 of the Original Side Rules. The plaintiffs filed an appeal against this order of the Master to the learned Judge in Chambers, Krishnaswami Naydu, J. He allowed the. appeal and dismissed the application made by the defendants. He was of the opinion that the suit had been properly instituted under Order 7 of the Original Side Rules. It is against this order of the learned Judge that the above O.S.A., has been filed by the defendants.

A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents that no appeal-lay as the order was not a "judgment" within the meaning of that term in clause 15 of the Letters Patent. No direct authority on the question which falls for decision in this case was brought to our notice by counsel on either side. The leading authority is the ruling of the Full Bench in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar1. The test laid down therein by White, C.J., which has often been cited in later decisions, is as follows:

"The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit, or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause".

It appears to me to be clear that the order in question does not fulfil the condition laid down above. The effect of this order is certainly not to put an end to the suit or proceeding. Nor can this order be treated as an order on an independent proceeding ancillary to the suit such as, for example, an order on an application for interim injunction or for the appointment of a receiver, which might be a judgment within the meaning of the clause.

The test laid down in this case has been followed by this Court in dealing with several classes of orders. It was held in Maharaja of Pithapuram v. Rama Rao2, that an order of a single Judge of the High Court refusing to revoke an order granting ‘leave to sue on the Original Side of the High Court, is not appealable under clause 15 if the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the suit is still open to the defendant and can be raised on an appropriate issue at the trial of the suit. An order refusing to transfer a suit or proceeding pending in one Court to another Court has been held to be not a judgment, Narasa Reddi v. Hajee Tar Mohammad Ayub Sait3 and Kondayya v. Official Receiver, Nellore4. Interlocutory orders like an order transposing a defendant as a plaintiff (Official Assignee v. Ramalingappa5 an order adding a party Ramaswamy v. Kanniappa6and an order referring back a report of the Official Referee to him, Maneckji v. Wadia7, have all been held by this Court to be not judgments within the meaning of that clause. In all these cases the suit or proceeding was n