The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, which allows the mortgagor to redeem the property within thirty years.

1. This Second appeal is focussed by the original plaintiffs, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 25.11.09 passed in A.S.No.17 of 2009 by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court – II) Ranipet, reversing the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Arcot in O.S.No.130 of 2006. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.

2. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus:

(a) The respondents/plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the following reliefs:

"(i) To redeem the Usufructuary mortgage dated 06.03.1972 in the schedule mentioned property ; and

(ii) To direct the defendant to deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs; and

(iii) for costs." (Extracted as such)

(b) The written statement was filed by the first defendant resisting the suit on the main ground that the suit property was barred by limitation.

(c) Whereupon the trial Court framed the issues.

(d) During trial, on the side of the plaintiffs, one Mr.Thusthagir Basha was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A13 were marked. On the side of the defendants, the first defendant-Xavier Sundaraj examined himself as D.W.1 and Exs.B1 to B14 were marked.

(e) Ultimately the trial Court dismissed the suit on the main ground that it was barred by limitation, as against which the plaintiffs preferred appeal, whereupon, the appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit granting the following reliefs:

“TAMIL”

3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the first appellate Court, the defendants preferred this Second Appeal on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law:

"1. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in reversing the well considered judgment of the trial Court without assigning any reason as to why the appellate court is not agreeing with the conclusion of the trial Court?

2. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the claim of the appellants that the mortgagor has given up the right of redemption in not established?

3. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation?" (extracted as such)

4. My learned Predecessor framed the following substantial question of law:

"Whether the lower appellate court has wrongly decided the question of limitation?"

5. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would put forth and set forth his arguments to the effect that admittedly the usufructuary mortgage emerged as per Ex.A1, the mortgage deed dated 06.03.1972. Whereas, the suit was filed in the year 2006 long after 12 years, but the first appellate Court failed to take note of the same and simply decreed the suit ignoring the limitation point.

6. In a bid to torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth on the side of the appellants/defendants, the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs, would submit that the clause in Ex.A1 stipulated that after five years, the mortgagor could redeem the mortgage and that 30 years period should be calculated after the expiry of five years. Accordingly if calculated, it is clear that the suit was filed well within the limitation period and the first appellate Court extracting the relevant Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act decided the lis properly, warranting no interference in the Second Appeal.

7. Indubitably and indisputably, the usufructuary mortgage was created in favour of the appellants/defendants by the respondents/plaintiffs. There was a stipulation in the mortgage deed itself i.e. Ex.A1, that after five years the mortgagor would be having the right to redeem the same by repaying the sum of Rs.4,000/- without interest. Ex.A1-the mortgage deed was dated 06.03.1972, and the five years period expired by 06.03.1977 and the suit was filed in the