The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, in determining the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance.

1. Defendants are the appellants.

2. The suit was filed by the deceased respondent Puviyarasu @ Jaganathan for specific performance of an agreement of sale executed by the appellants. The case of the plaintiff was that the appellant entered into an agreement of sale with him on 24.5.1981 agreeing to sell the suit property for a sum of Rs.1,63,400/= and also received an advance of Rs.30,000/= on that day and as per the agreement, the appellant should execute the sale deed within three months after getting permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities and without taking any steps, to obtain the clearance from the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, the appellants received various sums on various dates starting from 18.1.1982 to 20.9.1987 totalling to Rs.96,000/= and they also received another sum of Rs.3000/= on 17.9.1981 and therefore, considering the advance and the payments received later, the appellants received Rs.1,29,000/= towards the sale consideration and the first respondent/plaintiff was liable to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.34,400/= and on 24.4.1990, a notice was sent by the plaintiff calling upon the appellants to execute the sale deed after getting permission from the competent authorities under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and even thereafter, they did not take steps to get clearance and sent a reply on 31.5.1990 asking the plaintiff to receive the amount already paid by him and therefore, the suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement of sale.

3. The appellants contested the suit stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance as the suit properties were not properly described and it cannot be conveyed as per the description given in the agreement of sale and therefore, the agreement of sale is void for vagueness. Further, the permission from the authorities could not be obtained and the properties were also notified under the Land Acquisition proceedings and hence, the agreement is incapable of performance. It was further stated that the plaintiff agreed to get the permission from the authorities using his influence and he did not act according to the promise and therefore, they are not bound to execute the sale deed.

4. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the agreement was bad on the ground of vagueness and there was latches on the part of the deceased plaintiff in filing the suit and some of the lands were under the Land Acquisition proceedings and the sale could not be effected for want of clearance from the Urban Land Ceiling authorities and ordered refund of Rs.1,29,000/= with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 24.4.1990.

5. The first appellate court reversed the finding and allowed the appeal and granted the relief of specific performance holding that time was not the essence of the contract and the appellants admitted the execution of the sale deed and also received consideration on various dates and the properties are agricultural dry lands and the appellants have no right to rescind the agreement and therefore, the appellants are liable to execute the sale deed.

6. The following substantial questions of law were framed at the time of admission of the second appeal:-

"1) Whether the lower appellate court was right in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation?

2) Whether the lower appellate court was right in granting the relief of specific performance of a contingent contract?

3) Whether the lower appellate court was right in reversing the judgment and decree without setting out its reasons for being unable to agree with the reasonings and conclusions of the trial court?"

7. Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that admittedly, the agreement of sale was entered on 24.5.1981 and notice was issued on 24.4.1990 and on 31.5.1990, reply was sent by the appellants expressing their unwillingness to execute the sale deed and requested the deceased plaintiff to receive the advance paid by him and therefore