The main legal point established in the judgment is that the rights of co-trustees can be extinguished by the law of limitation, and the scheme of management should be upheld unless it is shown to be injurious to the interests of the trust.

1. This is an appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (East) in a suit which was brought by the respondent to enforce his turn of management of the plaint temple and its endowments, for a period of 3 years commencing from the 15th July 1899.

2. It is admitted that the plaint temple (with its endowments) is a public religious institution that the trusteeship thereof is hereditary in the family of the parties to the suit, but that the family has no beneficial interest in the property or income of the temple. Mayandi Chetti, the grandfather of the respondent and the great-grandfather of the appellant, was the last sole trustee, and on his death, the office devolved by inheritance on his male descendants by his two wives. Four of them were his grandsons or great-grandsons through his first wife, and the other four grandsons or great-grandsons through the second (see paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge). Under the notion apparently, that Mayandis property devolved in equal undivided moieties (1 Stranges Hindu Law p. 205) upon the respective descendants by his two wives, the management of the temple was until about 1881-82, conducted by these in rotation, each for one year.

3. We agree with the Subordinate Judge that the management was taken alternately by one member of each branch and not--as falsely asserted by the appellant,--by the members of the senior branch consecutively for four years and then by the members of the junior branch likewise for four years. We also agree with the Subordinate Judge that since 1881-82 (in which year the management was in the hands of a member of the junior branch) the respondent has been managing the temple not only during the years of his own turn, but also during the years of the turns of the members of the junior branch. We are, however, unable to agree with the Subordinate Judge that the appellant, at the end in July 1899 of the year of his turn transferred possession of the villages to the respondent, that the respondent was thereafter dispossessed and that he is on that ground entitled to the decree sought for.

4. The respondents claim is clearly stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint. In paragraph 3 it is stated that it has been arranged that during every term of 8 years of management, the management was to be by the four members of the senior branch the respondent having his turns in the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th years the appellant in the 3rd year and the other two members in the 1st and 7th years respectively. The appellant has thus had full opportunity to disprove this arrangement or establish why the same is not binding upon him or should be discontinued. In paragraph 4 of the plaint it is further stated that the four members of the junior branch (whose turns of management would come in the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th years) transferred their turns to the respondent, and "that he has been enjoying the same for about 19 years without any objection and with full right."

5. The appellants pleader, in support of the appeal, chiefly urges (1) that the evidence adduced in proof of the transfer is legally inadmissible, inasmuch as the alleged transfer was by an unstamped instrument (which is said to have been lost) (ii) that such transfer, even if proved, is invalid in law, (iii) that the right of the members of the junior branch, as co-trustees, has not been extinguished by the law of limitation, and (iv) that even if their right had been extinguished, the respondent could not as against the appellant acquire a right, under the law of limitation, to the additional number of turns of management claimed by him.

6. If the respondents title in the suit rested merely on the transfer made to him by the four members of the junior branch (who were co-trustees with him and the other members of the senior branch), it must be admitted that in the absence of the alleged instrument of transfer--which was admittedly unstamped and unregistered,--other evidence in pro