The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for valid assent from sapindas for an adoption, the inefficacy of assent obtained on false representation, and the sufficiency of assent from divided kinsmen.

1. This is a suit to obtain a declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant the widow of one Ramayya is invalid on the grounds that the 1st defendants had no authority from her husband to make the adoption, and that the alleged assent of the 3rd defendant alone to the adoption is invalid and insufficient in law. The plaintiff and the 3rd defendant are divided brothers, being the nearest existing cousins of the deceased Ramayya, who died issueless about 20 years ago, leaving him surviving no undivided member of his family. The 2nd defendant, who is the son of a remote gnati of the deceased, was, shortly before the institution of this suit, adopted by the 1st defendant, who purported to adopt him in pursuance of her husbands oral authority and of the assent of the 3rd defendant and some other gnatis. The District Judge disbelieved the evidence as to the oral authority given by the husband, but upheld the adoption on the grounds that, according to the proper construction of the document (Exhibit 111) executed by the 3rd defendant signifying his assent to the adoption, his consent was one given independently of the alleged authority of the husband, that such assent was not proved to have been given from corrupt motives, and that the assent of the 3rd defendant alone was sufficient in law inasmuch as "it would have been useless for the widow to have sought also the assent of the plaintiff who probably wanted one of his own sons to be adopted by her."

2. Notwithstanding the attempt made before us by the respondents pleader to impugn the finding of the District Judge as to the alleged authority from the husband, we are quite satisfied that his finding is correct and that the oral evidence in support of the alleged authority is altogether untrustworthy. We also agree with the District Judge that the evidence is by no means sufficient to establish that the 3rd defendants assent was procured for a pecuniary consideration.

3. The two questions which have been chiefly argued at length before us are (1) whether the 3rd defendants assent is not null and void as having been given on a representation made by the widow that she had her husbands authority to make the adoption and (2) whether the assent of the 3rd defendant alone is sufficient in law, either absolutely or under the circumstances of the case.

4. The principle of law applicable to the determination of the first question as laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishoro and in Karunabidhi Ganesha Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar I.L.R. 71. A 173 and followed by this Court in Venkatalakshmamma v. Narasayya I.L.R. 8 Mad. 545. is that the assent of a sapinda to an adoption to be made by the widow of a deceased kinsman should be one given by him in the exercise of his discretion as to whether the adoption ought or ought not to be made by a widow not having her husbands authority to make the adoption and that, therefore, a sapindas consent obtained by the widow upon a representation that she had received authority to adopt from her husband, when no such authority has in fact been given, is inefficacious in law. Applying this principle to the present case, the 3rd defendants assent would undoubtedly be inefficacious if it could be regarded as having been influenced by the widows allegation of authority from her husband.

5. We are quite unable to concur with the District Judge in construing Exhibit III as the according of an independent assent by the 3rd defendant, whether the husband had given permission or not. On the contrary the document expressly recites that in asking the 3rd defendant to give his assent also, the widows proposal to him was to make an adoption in pursuance of her husbands authority given to her in the presence of the 3rd defendant and other guatis. The learned pleader for the respondents seeks to distinguish the present case from the cases above referred to, on the ground that if no auth