The right of beneficiaries to compensation under Act XIII of 1855 is distinct for each beneficiary, and the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Indian Limitation Act were held to be inapplicable to the cases.

1. In one of these cases the plaintiffs are the minor children of one, Johnson, a railway passenger who was killed in the Mangapatam railway accident. The plaintiffs sue with their mother, the widow of the deceased, as their next friend; in the other suit the plaintiffs are the minor children of a Hindu named Narayanasamy Mudali, another Railway passenger who lost his life in the same accident. They also sue with their mother, the widow of the deceased as their next friend. In neither case is there any executor or administrator of the deceased. The suits are brought against the Madras Railway Company for compensation under Act XIII of 1855 and were instituted after the expiry of one year from the death of persons referred to. The question is whether the suits are time-barred. The answer to this question must be in the affirmative with reference to Art, 21 of Schedule IT of the Indian Limitation Act unless the bar is saved by the provisions of Sections 7 or 8 of the Act.

2. Before proceeding to consider the applicability of those provisions to the cases, it is necessary to see what is the precise nature of the right conferred by Act XIII of 1855 under which the claims are made. As stated in the preamble of the Act itself the relations of a person whose death was caused by the wrongful act of another were not, prior to its enactment, entitled to claim compensation on account of the death. The right to claim compensation in respect of such a death was created by the Act. It is provided that every suit shall be for the benefit of certain specified near relations of the deceased" and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased.

3. The learned Advocate-General for the defendants contends that in the case of Europeans and Eurasians" the only " representative" of a deceased man is his executor or administrator, and that in this Act the word " representative" has no application to Europeans and Eurasians but is used only with reference to Hindus and Mahomedans. Mr. Chamier for the plaintiffs contends that the word " representative" in the Act is equivalent to, and includes, all the " heirs" of the deceased. We do not think that either of these views is correct. That the word is not equivalent to " heirs" seems clear from the fact that in Act XII of 1855 which was passed on the same day as Act XIII and which deals with a cognate subject, the right is given to bring a Suit against " heirs or representatives" of the deceased wrong-doer. Nor do we think that there is any reason for limiting the meaning of " representative " in the narrow way suggested by the Advocate-General. We think that the word means and includes all or any one of the persons for whose benefit a suit under the Act can be maintained. These persons are the representatives of the deceased in the sense that they are the persons taking the place of the deceased in obtaining reparation for the wrong done.

4. In cases where the deceased is represented by an executor or an administrator such an executor or administrator is given the power to sue for the compensation for the benefit of the specified relations. Where there is no executor or administrator or where there is one and he fails or is unwilling to sue, then in our opinion the suit may be instituted by and in the name of the " representative of the person deceased." But one suit only is allowed to enforce the claims of all the persons beneficially entitled, it being provided that the rights of each and every one of them shall be adjudged and adjusted by the Court in such suit. The right of each beneficiary is only to receive compensation in proportion to the loss occasioned to him by the death of his deceased relative.

5. From this it follows and it was in effect so decided in Pym v. The Great Northern Railway Company 4 B.& S. P. 396 with reference to the provisions of Lord Campbells Act, that the right of the beneficiaries to compensation is a right d