The main legal point established is that the violation of a legal right, whether contractual or proprietary, without sufficient justification, constitutes a cause of action, entitling the affected party to seek an injunction, even without an express finding of actual damage.

Charles Arnold White, C.J.

1. The facts of this case, as admitted or found, are stated in the judgment of my learned brother, which I have had the advantage of reading.

2. It seems to me that whether we regard the relations between the plaintiff and Government, with reference to the supply of water as contractual, the view taken in Chinnappa Mudaliar v. Sikka Naikan I.L.R. (1900) M. 36, or whether we regard the plaintiffs right to the water of the channel as a proprietary right appurtenant to the ownership of the land - in either view, I think the injunction which has been granted can be sustained without any express finding that actual damage has been suffered by the plaintiff.

3. Assuming the rights of the plaintiff as against the Government to be contractual, I do not think it is necessary in order to uphold the injunction which has been granted to pray in aid the principle of the decisions in Temperton v. Russell (1893) I.Q.B. 715 and Quinn v. Leatham (1903) A.C. 495. In fact, I doubt whether the principle of these decisions has any application to the present case. This is not, a case of inducing a man to break his contract with a third party. No question of combination - the fact there are more defendants than one does not show combination - or of conspiracy to injure arises. If an act has been done by the defendants, which deprives the plaintiff of the enjoyment of a contractual right - assuming the right to be contractual I think, subject to the question of damage to the plaintiff, which I will deal with later, the plaintiff has a right of action against the defendants.

4. In his judgment in Quinn v. Leatham (1853) 2 E. & B. 216. Lord Macnaghten, in discussing Lumley v. Gye said (page 510). "Speaking for myself, I have no hesitation in saying that I think the decision was right, not on the ground of malicious intention - that was not, I think, the gist of the action - but on the ground that a violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and that it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference." I take it, Lord Macnaghten assumed that the violation of the legal right caused damage to the party whose right had been violated.

5. The question of course remains, assuming the plaintiffs rights as against Government to be contractual what is the contract? The contract, it any, is a contract on the pan of Government to continue such supply as is sufficient for the accustomed requirements of the ryot wari land-holder see Sankaravadivelu Pillai v. Secretary of State for India In Council I.L.R. (1904) M. 72. It may well be that if Government had blocked up the channel in question the plaintiff would have no cause of action against them if they could show that they bad made other provision to supply him with water sufficient to meet his accustomed requirements. But I do not think this defence is open to the defendants. Even if it were, they have not attempted to set it up. They have not sought to justify their act on any ground of law in the View that the channel which they blocked up was the channel which had been irrigating the plaintiffs lauds. The case was fought in the lower Courts solely on the question whether the plaintiffs lands had in fact been irrigated by the channel which the defendants blocked up.

6. I think the defendants act was in violation of the plaintiffs right, and applying the law as enunciated by Lord Macnaghten in the passage I have cited I think the plaintiff has a right of action against the defendants, if, as the result of their act, he has sustained damage. It is true there is no express finding as to damage and though there is a general allegation of injury, no damages are claimed in the suit. But I think the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction without any express finding as to damage. It might have been otherwise if the result of the defendants act had merely been to dim