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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Munro and Pinhey, JJ.
G. Padmaraju Pantulu
Versus
S.S. Vencatramana Iyer
Decided On : 17.09.1908
Defamation - Privileged Communication - The court applied the principle that no action of libel or slander lies against judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties for words spoken in the ordinary course of any proceedings before a court or tribunal recognized by law, as established in English Law and upheld in previous Indian court decisions.
Fact of the Case:
The complainant brought a charge of defamation against the accused for asking about a criminal offense during cross-examination in a Small Cause suit.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the accused's action was privileged and not liable to prosecution for defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, based on the principle that no action of libel or slander lies in the ordinary course of proceedings before a court or tribunal recognized by law.
Issues: Privileged communication in defamation case, application of English Law principle in Indian context
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principle that no action of libel or slander lies against certain individuals for words spoken in the ordinary course of proceedings before a court or tribunal recognized by law, as established in English Law and upheld in previous Indian court decisions.
Final Decision: The accused's action was privileged, and he was not liable to be prosecuted for defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code.
1. The complainant was being cross-examined by the accuseds Vakil in a Small Cause suit. The Vakil at the instance of the accused asked the complainant whether he had not been prosecuted for a criminal offence. The complainant, therefore, brought a charge of defamation against the accused under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. A preliminary objection was taken before the Magistrate that the action of the accused was privileged, but the objection was overruled. Hence this revision petition by the accused.
2. The principle of English Law is that no action of libel or slander lies whether against judges, counsel, witnesses or parties for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any proceedings before any Court or tribunal recognized by law"--Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby L.R. 8 Q.B. 255. If the present question were arising for the first time we might hesitate to apply the above principle in the face of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. The principle, however, has been acted upon by this Court in a series of decisions--Vide Sullivan v. Norton 10 M.k 28, Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti 11 M.k 477, Hayes v. Christian 15 M.k 414, Queen-Empress v. Govinda Pillai 16 M.k 235, In the matter of Alraja Naidu 30 M.k 222, and we are not prepared to dissent from their decisions. It follows that the action of the accused was privileged and that he is not liable to be prosecuted for defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The Presidency Magistrate should dispose of the case in the light of the above remarks.
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