The valuation of relief in a suit for cancellation of a conveyance should be based on the market value of the property, as stated in Section 7(iv)(a) of the Court-Fees Act.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The question which the Court is called upon to consider in this case is whether in a suit for the cancellation of a deed of conveyance and for possession of the property the plaintiff should value his relief in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(iv)(a) or those of Section 7(v) of the Court-Fees Act. The plaintiff in this case filed a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Tenali for a decree setting-aside a conveyance which he had executed and for possession of the land covered by the deed, pleading that he had been induced to sign the instrument as the result of undue influence and fraud. On the basis that the plaint fell for the purpose of valuation within para, (v) of the section he affixed a stamp fee of the value of Rs. 34-13-0. The District Munsiff considered that para. (iv)(a) applied, which meant a court-fee of Rs. 119-15-0. Para. (v), as amended by the Madras Act of 1922, requires that in a suit for the possession of land the relief shall be valued at ten times the annual revenue payable to Government where such revenue is settled but not permanently; and that is the position here. By the amending Act para. (iv)(a) was inserted. This paragraph requires the court-fee in a suit for the cancellation of a conveyance to be calculated on the value of the property. The case has been placed before a Full Bench because there are conflicting decisions of this Court on the question whether on a suit of this nature the valuation should be according to the market value or whether the relief should be valued in accordance with one of the methods mentioned in para. (v).

2. In Dantuluri Venkatanarasimha Raja v. Dantuluri Chandrayya (1926) 53 M.L.J. 267, Krishnan and Odgers, JJ., held that the value contemplated in Section 7(iv)(a) was not the market value. It was said that where it was sought to set aside a decree affecting immovable property, the value of the relief should be calculated on the basis of a suit falling within para. (v). The reason given was that as the Act itself contained rules for the valuing of suits for possession of immovable property it was proper to take a method indicated by the Act in preference to any other method. A decision to the same effect was given in Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi AIR1932Mad605 , by a Division Bench consisting of Reilly and Anantakrishna Aiyar, JJ., but the judgments in that case do not add anything to what was said in the earlier case. These decisions were followed by King and Stodart, JJ., in a recent unreported case (S.A. No. 592 of 1932).

3. The same question was raised before Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Bali Reddi v. Abdul Satar AIR1935Mad863 . The learned Judge considered that the proper method of calculating the value of the subject matter of a suit falling under para. (iv)(a) was the market value. He felt that he was not bound by the previous Bench decisions because the case before him related to mortgages and sale deeds whereas Dantuluri Venkatanarasimha Raju v. Dantuluri Chandrayya (1926) 53 M.L.J. 267 and Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi AIR1932Mad605 related to decrees affecting immovable property. The decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J., was followed by Wadsworth, J., in Venkatakrishnayya v. Sheik Ali Sahib (1938) 48 L.W. 277.

4. We consider that the view taken by Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Bali Reddi v. Abdul Sattar AIR1935Mad863 is preferable to that taken in Dantuluri Venkatanarasimha Raju v. Dantuluri Chandrayya (1926) 53 M.L.J. 267. Para. (iv)(a) deals with suits where it is necessary for the plaintiff to seek the cancellation of a decree or of a deed. Para. (v) relates merely to suits for possession. In a suit for possession it is not always necessary to set aside a decree or a document. Where a suit is merely for possession the Act says how the value of the subject-matter shall be arrived at. When adding para. (iv)(a) to Section 7 the Legislature did not say that in a suit falling within the new paragraph t