The main legal point established in the judgment is that a natural guardian under Hindu law has the power to bind the minors estate by incurring a simple contract debt for necessary or beneficial purposes, and the test of the validity of similar transactions by other persons is based on Hindu law principles.

Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.

1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent against the judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J., in S.A. No. 492 of 1934. By that judgment he has reversed the decree of both the lower Courts and dismissed the suit with costs throughout.

2. The appeal raises a question of importance involving a decision as to the limits within which a natural guardian under Hindu law can incur a simple contract debt so as to bind the minors estate. That such a guardian has the power to borrow by charging, mortgaging or even by selling the estate or a sufficient portion of it, for purposes termed necessary or beneficial according to that law, cannot at this time of the day be questioned. It is also settled that even in the absence of a proved necessity or benefit, an honest creditor can still recover the debt from the estate if he can show that in advancing the money he acted in the bona fide belief after due enquiry, that the guardian was acting for such a purpose in incurring the debt. These principles which are based as much on Hindu law as on general considerations of equity, have been held to afford a test of the validity of similar transactions by other persons also who occupy an analogous position. The manager of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara, female owners in possession of inherited property, the head of a Mutt, and the Dharmakartha of a temple are among the class of persons whose powers are so limited. Indeed it can be truly said that what the Judicial Committee said with regard to a guardian in Hunoomanpersauds case (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393, has become an integral part of the branch of the law relating to the borrowing powers of all qualified owners. In the case of all such persons there exists in fact, no difference in the test to be applied whether the money is obtained by pledge or sale of the property, or by way of a simple loan.

3. The decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., if we understand it aright, appears to introduce into this branch of the law a distinction between simple loans and loans borrowed on the security of property and to lay down with respect to the former a stricter rule than that which obtains in the latter. We are ho doubt in this case concerned with the powers of a mother and natural guardian but it is none the lesss necessary to bear in mind that any interference with a rule so general in its application as that laid down in Hunoomanpersauds Case (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393 may tend to create uncertainty in the administration of the law as regards also the other persons, who belong to the same group and are governed by the same principles. We should therefore hesitate to sanction a departure from what appears to be a well-established principle unless we are satisfied that there is clear authority to the contrary.

4. The learned Judge has expressed the opinion that the law is correctly summed up in the following statement in Trevelyan on Minors at page 169:

Although a guardian may under certain circumstances sell or charge the wards property he cannot bind the ward personally by a simple contract debt, by a covenant, or by any promise to pay money or damages unless such promise is made merely to pay or to keep alive the debt for which the wards property was liable.

5. This passage means according to Venkataramana Rao, J., as indeed it does seem to mean, that a guardian cannot, without charging the estate, contract so as to bind the minor, except it be to pay or keep alive a debt already in existence, and binding on the estate. On this view a pre-existing debt or liability could alone support a simple contract debt and not necessity, nor benefit. In fact he says that:

The test is not a mere question of benefit nor the mere fact that the debt was incurred for necessary purposes; the observations made in some of the cases that where the debt is incurred by the guardian for necessary purposes, his estate can be rendered liable are too broadly made.

6. The learned advocate for the respondent has bee