Material alterations in a promissory note render it void under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but the plaintiff can still rely on the original consideration as the promissory note remains admissible in evidence.

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted on the basis of a promissory note dated the 15th October, 1928, executed by the defendant-respondent in favour of one Brojo Padhi who died shortly after its execution leaving him surviving an adopted minor son the plaintiff-appellant in this case. A sum of Rs. 10 seems to have been paid by the defendant on the 12th October, 1931. This payment was endorsed on the back of the promissory note and the endorsement was duly signed by the defendant. The suit was instituted on the 22nd October, 1934, while the plaintiff-appellant was a minor. It appears however that two dates in the promissory note were altered before the suit was brought. The first alteration was that the figure "1" in 15, that is, the date on which the promissory note was executed was altered into 2 and thus the promissory note would now read as if it was executed on the 25th October, 1928, and not on the 15th October. The second alteration was that the figure "1" in 12 was substituted by 2 and thus the endorsement by the defendant of the payment of Rs. 10 would appear to have been made on the 22nd October, 1931, and not on the 12th October, 1931, the date on which the endorsement was actually made by the defendant. The District Munsif passed a decree against the defendant as the plaintiff was held to have been unaware of these alterations but the learned District Judge accepted the appeal on the ground that having regard to the provisions of Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it was not possible to found an action on a promissory note which was proved to have been altered in material respects. The plaintiff now appeals.

2. In support of his appeal the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the alteration in the promissory note was not material in character and the motive with which the alteration might have been made was wholly irrelevant. His second contention is that even if the alterations are held to be material his client who was, as stated above, a minor at the time when the suit was instituted, did not know anything about them and could not in the absence of any conduct of his, either fraudulent or negligent, be held to be debarred from suing on the basis of the promissory note - particularly when the dates of the promissory note and of the endorsement of payment were correctly stated in the plaint and no advantage was attempted to have been taken on account of these alterations. The third contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that even if his first two contentions do not prevail, he should at all events be allowed to fall back on the original consideration as although the promissory note might have to be declared void and unenforceable on account of the alterations, yet it does not become inadmissible in evidence and the debt could not in any case be held to have been extinguished. It was admitted that the suit, as framed, was not based on the original consideration but this defect should be, it was alleged, cured by a formal amendment which might be allowed by the Court even at this stage. Lastly it was urged that a decree should have been passed against the defendant on the admission made by him as a witness to the effect that the money in regard to the promissory note in suit had not been paid and was still outstanding.

3. The first question to decide is whether the alterations made in the promissory note were material in character?

4. Since it was conceded on"behalf of the respondent that the suit could have been instituted, on account of the plaintiffs minority, not only on the date on which it was actually brought but even later, it was vehemently argued on behalf of the appellant that the alterations could not be regarded as material. I am not however impressed by this argument although it must be admitted that the motive of the person making the alterations is to a large extent immaterial. In order to decide the material charact