The judgment emphasizes the importance of pleadings and the principle that parties should be confined to the case raised by them in their pleadings. It also highlights the principle of possession as evidence of title and its relevance in granting relief.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondent for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his enjoyment of the suit property and, in case it was found that the respondent was not in possession, for delivery of possession free from the obstruction of the appellant. The respondent claimed title under an Inam grant alleged to have been made to his predecessors-in-title by the Carnatic rulers for the supply of Tulasi to the Kallalagar Devasthanam in the Madura District. The respondent also alleged that in or about the year 1918 the trustees of Ramalingaswami Mutt falsely set up title to the suit properties and it the instance of some mediators, the dispute with them was settled by the trustees giving what is described as a release sale deed relinquishing all their interest in the suit properties, and recognising the respondents title thereto. Since then, the respondent claimed to have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties down to the year 1933 when the appellant disturbed his possession under colour of a sale deed obtained by him from one Singaram Pillai. The appellant denied the title as well as the possession put forward by the respondent and pleaded that the property originally belonged to one Narayana Paradesi from whose successor-in-title he obtained the property by sale deed dated 14th February, 1933.

2. The trial Court found that the Inam grant put forward by the respondent related only to the Melwaram interest in the land but that he acquired the right to the land itself by virtue of the release deed executed by ths trustees of Ramalingaswami Mutt and thus became the full owner of the suit property. As regards the respondents possession, he held that the evidence on record was not sufficient to establish an acquisition of title by the respondent by adverse possession if the respondent was held to have no title otherwise.

3. On appeal the learned District Judge confirmed the finding of the District Munsif that the Inam grant was only of the Melwaram but disagreed with him on the question of the respondents title. He held that the release deed Ex. B could not confer a valid title on the respondent because only two out of the four trustees of the Mutt executed it, and besides it was not shown to have been executed for any necessary purpose binding on the Mutt. He, however, held that the respondent got possession of the properties under Ex. B and continued in possession till he was disturbed in such possession by the appellant in 1933 and that the respondent was entitled to a decree on the basis of his possession irrespective of any question of title. As the Mutt was not a party to the suit, the learned Judge thought it was unnecessary to decide whether the respondent had acquired title by adverse possession against the Mutt.

4. The learned Counsel for the appellant raised two contentions before me. First he urged that when a plaintiff bases his suit on title, he cannot claim relief on the strength of his mere anterior possession even alternatively; he could rely upon possession only as evidence of the title put forward by him but not as an independent ground of claim by itself. For this somewhat startling proposition, he relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court, Govindbhai v. Dahyabhahi (1935) 38 Bom. L.R. 175 : I.A.R. 1936 Bom. 201. There the trial Court found that the plaintiff in that case had more or less a precarious possession for a short period and it was with reference to that finding which the learned Judges described as tentative that they made their observations at page 208 of the report. I do not understand that decision as laying down what in effect would be a new rule of misjoinder not warranted by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. The learned Counsel next contended that even if it is permissible to put forward mere previous possession as a ground of claim, in the alternative, in a suit based primarily