The survey decision under the Madras Act IV of 1897 does not interrupt the continuity of adverse possession and does not preclude the use of the period of prior possession to establish adverse possession.

Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.

1. The plaintiff is the appellant. The property in dispute is a house in Allipuram, a suburb of Vizagapatam. The original owner was one Sekharamantri Appalaswami, the father of the first defendant in the suit and the first respondent in the second appeal. Sekharamantri Appalaswami was indebted to the father of respondents 2 to 5, one Kanti Mahanti Appalanarasayya. For the recovery of the debt, K. Appalanarasayya instituted a suit against Appalaswami, and in execution of the decree obtained therein purchased the suit house on 7th January, 1916, and obtained a sale certificate on 2nd July, 1920. Though he thus obtained a perfect title to the house, he never reduced it to possession either by process in execution or otherwise. S. Appalaswami and after him his son the first respondent have continued in undisturbed possession of the house. By the date of the suit, they had been in possession for over fifteen years, a period sufficiently long to give them a prescriptive title under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act against K. Appalanarasayya or any one claiming under him, or indeed against all the world. The plaintiff derives his title to the suit house from K. Appalanarasayya. He had advanced money on a mortgage of the house to the latter. On that mortgage the plaintiff instituted a suit and obtained a decree. In execution the plaintiff himself purchased the house on 6th September, l929, and a sale certificate was issued to him on 10th October, 1929. Resisted in obtaining possession by the first defendant, he filed an application to remove the obstruction but the application was dismissed. Within one year of this adverse order, the plaintiff instituted the present suit to set aside the order, and to recover possession of the house. The claim is resisted by the first defendant, on the ground that the appellants title assuming he had a good title has been lost by adverse possession. Seeing that on the findings of the Courts below the first respondent and his father have been in continuous and exclusive adverse possession of the property, the. appellant would prima facie be barred. Acting on this view the Courts below have dismissed the suit, overruling a contention of the appellant advanced with the object of getting over the bar Of limitation.

2. To appreciate that contention a few facts are necessary. In 1922, there was a Town Survey of Vizagapatam and its suburbs, in one of which namely Allipuram, we have said that the suit house is situate. The site of the house was demarcated as No, 967 belonging to K, Appalanarasayya, who as we have already mentioned, had purchased the property in Court auction in 1916, and had accordingly a perfectly good title at the time. This survey number as well as certain others formed the subject-matter of a survey dispute as shown by the order dated 29th November, 1922, of the appellate survey authority in land complaint Appeal No. 126 F.B. It may at this stage be mentioned that the survey was conducted under the provisions of the Survey and Boundaries Act (IV of 1897). It is found from the appellate order aforesaid that the appellant was one Mantri Lakshminarasimham. There were four respondents and two of them were K. Appalanarasayya and Section Appalaswami. It looks as if Survey No. 967 was claimed by the appellant as against K. Appalanarasayya and it does not appear that there was any dispute between K. Appalanarasayya and Section Appalaswami inter se as regards the suit house. The former produced his sale certificate of 1920, and on its strength he was recognised as the owner, and registered as such. The latter whose adverse possession was at the time only six years old could not with any chance of success object to the title of the former and for that reason apparently, acquiesced in the decision without raising any objection then or thereafter either within the time limited by Section 13 of the Act even afterwards. The survey order accordingly became final u