IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Abdur Rahman, J.
Sornammal
Versus
Thangavelu Mudaliar and Ors.
Decided On : 18.08.1939
Mortgage - Entitlement to Sue - Act Section List: Not specified - The determination of the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to sue depends mainly on a compromise arrived between her and her sister on the 8th October, 1930, in a suit for partition instituted by the latter in the Court of the District Munsif of Mayavaram (O.S. No. 5 of 1930) and embodied, in a decree (Exhibit D). The lower appellate Court was of opinion that the decree embodying the compromise was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration as the mortgage in suit had not formed the subject-matter of that litigation and did not therefore fall within the category of decrees which were exempt from registration. This decision has been challenged on three or four grounds: - firstly that the suit (O.S. No. 5 of 1930) was for general partition and the mortgage-deed must be, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, presumed to have formed the subject-matter of that suit; secondly, because no rights in the mortgage were created in the plaintiff for the first time and the decree or the compromise on which the decree was based only recorded or recited an event which had happened in the past.
Fact of the Case:
A mortgage was executed by Kandaswamy in 1915 in favor of Muthukumaraswami Pillai. The money due under the mortgage was not paid, and one of Muthukumaraswami's daughters brought a suit in 1932 for the sale of the mortgaged property. The plaintiff did not implead the other daughter as a party, leading the third defendant, who had purchased the mortgaged property, to object to the plaintiff's entitlement to sue alone.
Finding of the Court:
The court analyzed the compromise between the plaintiff and her sister in a partition suit and the admissibility of the decree embodying the compromise. The court found that the lower appellate court's decision to deem the decree inadmissible in evidence was challenged on several grounds, including the presumption that the mortgage-deed formed the subject-matter of the partition suit and the creation of rights in the plaintiff. The court also considered the objection raised by the third defendant regarding the inadmissibility of the decree for want of registration.
Issues: The issues revolved around the admissibility of the compromise decree, the presumption regarding the mortgage-deed in the partition suit, and the creation of rights in the plaintiff.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the interpretation of the compromise decree and the admissibility of the decree were key factors in determining the plaintiff's entitlement to sue alone. The court also emphasized the onus of proof on the defendant regarding the mortgage not forming the subject-matter of the partition suit.
Final Decision: The appeal succeeded, and the decree of the lower appellate court was reversed. The trial court's decree was restored, with the plaintiff being granted two months for payment and awarded costs both in the appellate court and the lower appellate court.
Abdur Rahman, J.
1. The facts out of which this appeal has arisen are not in dispute and lie in a narrow compass. A mortgage was executed on the 24th April, 1915, by one Kandaswamy, father of defendants 1 and 2 in favour of Muthukumaraswami Pillai who died in 1918 leaving him surviving a widow and two daughters. The widow appears to have died shortly after her husband and we are not concerned with her in the present litigation. The money due under the mortgage was not paid and one of Muthukumaraswamis daughters brought the present suit in June, 1932, for the sale of mortgaged property but she did not implead the other daughter as a party. This led the third defendant, who had purchased the mortgaged property from Kandaswamy and undertaken to discharge the mortgage debt, to raise the objection that the plaintiff was "not entitled solely and exclusively to sue on
2. The determination, of the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to sue depends mainly on a compromise arrived between her and her sister on the 8th October, 1930, in a suit for partition instituted by the latter in the Court of the District Munsif of Mayavaram (O.S. No. 5 of 1930) and embodied, in a decree (Exhibit D). The lower appellate Court was of opinion that the decree embodying the compromise was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration as the mortgage in suit had not formed the subject-matter of that litigation and did not therefore fall within the category of decrees which were exempt from registration. This decision has been challenged on three or four grounds: - firstly that the suit (O.S. No. 5 of 1930) was for general partition and the mortgage-deed must be, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, presumed to have formed the subject-matter of that suit; secondly, because no rights in the mortgage were created in the plaintiff for the first time and the decree or the compromise on which the decree was based only recorded or recited an event which had happened in the past. Mr. Raja Aiyar has, in the alternative, submitted that even if the decree were held to be inadmissible in evidence, the decree passed by the trial Court should not have been set aside as the event of the plaintiffs sisters death which occurred during the pendency of the suit could not have been ignored and the plaintiffs capacity to sue, even if defective at the time when the suit was instituted, could not be held to have remained so at the time when the suit came up for trial. In the end it was urged that the suit could not have been dismissed for non-joinder of the plaintiffs sister and it was incumbent on the lower appellate Court to deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Mr. Ramaswami Aiyar on the other hand contends that in the face of a concurrent finding by both the lower Courts to the effect that the mortgage did not form the subject-matter of the suit for partition, it would not be possible for this Court to hold otherwise. He also contended that Clause 7 of the decree could not be construed so as to contain a record merely of a past event. The present suit was not, according to him, dismissed on account of non-joinder but really on a question of limitation as it was instituted shortly before the expiry of the period of limitation provided for such suits and would have met the same fate even if the plaintiffs sister had remained alive. He also submitted that the plaintiffs status on the date of the suit could not be improved by the sisters subsequent death and it is only with the date on which the suit was instituted that we are now concerned.
3. In order to appreciate the various contentions raised by the parties it would be better to have a clear idea as to what this clause in the decree actually stated. It reads as follows:
As regards the recovery by the deed for Rs. 1,500, executed on 24th April, 1915, by Kandaswami Mudaliar in favour of the said Muthukumaraswami Pillai as
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