IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Venkataramana Rao, J.
Varada Bhaktavatsaludu and Anr.
Versus
Damojipurapu Venkatanarasimha Rao dead and Ors.
Decided On : 02.10.1939
Limitation - Partnership - Section 6, Section 7 of the Limitation Act - Article 109 - Hindu Law - Manager of Family - Valid Discharge - Madras Presidency - Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan (1912) 25 M.L.J. 405 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 118 - Jawahir Singh v. Udai Parkash (1925) 50 M.L.J. 344 : L.R. 53 IndAp 36 : I.L.R. 48 All. 152 - Ganga Dayal v. Mani Ram I.L.R.(1908) 31 All. 156
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs, minors at the time of their father's death, filed a suit for a declaration that their father's partnership with defendants must be deemed dissolved and for taking an account of the partnership. The main defence was limitation as the suit was filed more than three years from the date of the father's death.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the fourth defendant attained majority in 1927 and was in a position to give a valid discharge of the plaintiffs' claim as the manager of the family.
Issues: The main issues were whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the fourth defendant was in a position to give a valid discharge of the plaintiffs' claim.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the provisions of Section 6 and Section 7 of the Limitation Act, and considered the presumption under Hindu Law that the eldest member of a family is the manager. The court also discussed the interpretations and distinctions of relevant legal principles from cases such as Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan, Jawahir Singh v. Udai Parkash, and Ganga Dayal v. Mani Ram.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was barred by limitation and that the fourth defendant was in law and fact the manager, thus affirming the lower court's decision.
Venkataramana Rao, J.
1. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Ellore dismissing the plaintiffs suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The relevant facts may be shortly stated. The plaintiffs and the fourth defendant are the sons of one Varada Venkataramanayya. During his lifetime Varada Venkataramanayya as manager of his family entered into a partnership with defendants 1 to 3 for the carrying on of a mill business known as Gopalakrishna Rice Mill. He died on the 12th November, 1927, without adjusting his accounts with the partnership. This suit has been laid by the plaintiffs who were admittedly minors on the 29th October, 1931, for a declaration that the partnership which their father carried on with defendants 1 to 3 must be deemed to have been dissolved on the 12th November, 1927, and for taking an account of the partnership and for payment of such sums as maybe found due and payable appertaining to their fathers share. The main defence was one of limitation. The suit admittedly was instituted more than three years from the date of the death of Venkataramanayya. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the partnership must be deemed to have been dissolved on the date of the death of Venkataramanayya and under Article 109 the suit must be laid within three years from that date. But what the plaintiffs contend is that the plaintiffs were minors on the date of the death of their father and even on the date of suit were admittedly minors and therefore under Section 6 of the Limitation Act their suit must be deemed to be within time. But the defendants contend in answer that the fourth defendant was the eldest brother of the family and he attained his majority in July, 1927, that is, before the death of their father and he was therefore in a position to discharge all the claims made in the suit and the suit must be held to be barred under Section 7 of the Limitation Act. Therefore two main questions have to be decided, namely, (1) whether the fourth defendant attained majority in 1927 or in 1929 as contended by the plaintiffs-appellants in this case and (2) even assuming that the fourth defendant attained majority in 1927, was he in a position to give a discharge of the plaintiffs claim. On both the points the learned Subordinate Judges decision was in favour of the defendants. Mr. Subba Rao on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants contends that the learned Judge was wrong in finding that the fourth defendant attained majority in 1927. He says that the burden of proving that the fourth defendant attained majority in 1927 was on the defendants and they have not satisfactorily discharged the burden of proof which lay on them. He points out that the only material documents in the case are Exhibits III and III-A wherein the fourth defendants age was described as 16 in 1925 and therefore he could not have attained majority in 1927. What he says is that in India it must be presumed that the people generally give the running year as their age and not the completed year. For this position he relies upon the ruling in Kunhi Kannan v. Devaki AIR1939Mad907 . It may be so, but the evidence does not rest on Exhibits III and III-A. P.W. 3, the uncle of the plaintiffs, and the fourth defendant was examined on behalf of the plaintiffs and he states that his first son was born in the month of Jeshta in the year Sadharana which is between 8th June, 1910 and 6th July, 1910, and that the fourth defendant was one year or a year and a half older than his first son. This evidence was accepted by the learned Judge in the Court below and on this evidence coupled with the statements contained in Exhibits III and III-A and the deposition of the fourth defendant himself he has come to the conclusion that the fourth defendant must have attained majority at the beginning of 1927. P.W. 3 is certainly a near relation of the plaintiffs. Mr. Subba Rao contends that the age given by him was
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