The admissibility of evidence, the reliability of eyewitness testimony, and the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.

Burn, J.

1. The appellant has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Cuddapah of three offences of murder and has been sentenced to death.

2. This is a somewhat unusual case; the appellant single-handed is supposed to have killed a Forest Guard and, a Forest Watcher and another man. The prosecution case was, that the appellant and a little boy examined as P.W. 2 trespassed into the Forest Reserve near Thimmayagaripalli before daylight on the 16th March, 1939, and that they cut wood in the forest and were making their way to the village when they were caught by the Forest Guard Kesavalu, Forest Watcher Somayya and another man Penchulagadu a relation of Kesavalu. These three are supposed to have stopped the appellant and P.W. 2 and the appellant is supposed to have killed them one after the other: Kesavalu first, Penchulagadu second and Somayya third. Kesavalu and Penchulagadu are supposed to have been unarmed but Somayya was armed with a bill-hook which by the looks of it is quite as efficient a weapon as M.O. 5 which is said to be.the appellants weapon. The appellant escaped with nothing worse than a slight cut on his left forearm.

3. The prosecution story was spoken to in the Court of the committing magistrate by the little boy P.W. 2 who is a child of 13 and he described how on the morning of the 16th March, the appellant took him to cut fuel and how on the way back they were intercepted and the appellant cut all the three men. His deposition before the sub-Magistrate was filed in the Sessions Court as Ex. G. The learned Sessions Judge has not" expressly stated so, but it is clear that he meant to do this under the power conferred upon him by Section 288, Code of Criminal Procedure because the boy in the Sessions Court stated that he knew nothing whatever about the matter and obstinately refused to answer any questions except I do not know". P.W. 2 is supposed to have been the only eye-witness and the only other item of evidence of any importance against the appellant is that on the morning of the 19th of March, he made a statement to the Superintendent of Police which led to the discovery of a billhook (M.O. 5) which the appellant said was the weapon used by him to kill all the three deceased. The appellant thereupon is said to have taken the Police and certain respectable persons to a place in the forest 25 or 30 yards from the place where the v corpses were found and there to have produced from under a bush this aruval (M.O. 5). Supposing for the moment that the evidence is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, there is no corroboration of the truth of the statements made by the appellant because the aruval when sent to the Chemical Examiner was not found to be stained with blood. Mf. Jayarama Aiyar who has appeared for the appellant in this Court has contended that evidence regarding the statements made by the appellant before the production of (M.O. 5) ought not to have been admitted. We think that this contention is well-founded. The appellant is said to have made a statement to the Superintendent of Police P.W. 8 on the morning of the l9th march, but the Superintendent of Police was obliged to admit to four hours on the night before, that is, from 7-15 to 11-15 and for two hours on the morning of the 19th he was questioning the appellant. This was a flagrant violation of R. 303 in Vol. I of the Madras Police Executive Orders. It is there laid down that:

The practice of resorting to persuasion, trickery or oppression to induce any accused person to confess is prohibited. It is right that the Police, when they are endeavouring to discover the author of a Crime, should make inquiries of, or put questions to, any person from whom they think they can obtain useful information. But when once an accused person has been arrested, while they may, and indeed should, listen to any statement which he. may voluntarily make, they are strictly forbidden to interrogate him or press him to make a statement.

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